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Law evolves to accommodate change—this is axiomatic in most aca-
demic legal traditions. But in the era of the administrative state, with con-
gressional gridlock and a judiciary hesitant to address policy questions,
evolution of statutory law has become much more difficult. This leads to
pent up demand for change in legal regimes. If the legislature and the
courts cannot provide an outlet for this pressure, where does it go? How
does the law continue to change? Although other scholars have looked to
agencies as engines of legal change, we lack a theoretical framework to
understand how that change happens. I argue that an evolutionary frame-
work provides an informative model for understanding administrative le-
gal change.
I provide three case studies that demonstrate the administrative evolution
of the Endangered Species Act. In spite of tremendous advances in conser-
vation, fundamental changes in scientists’ understanding of human impacts
on the natural world, and increasingly strident clashes over private prop-
erty rights and endangered species, the Act has remained largely un-
changed for the last thirty-five years. In a functioning legislative system, the
Act would have been amended to accommodate many of these changes.
Instead, the case studies show a mechanism of legal change through agency
action analogous to the mechanisms underlying biological evolution.
Other commentators have argued the administrative state stymies evolu-
tion of the law, but this research contradicts that view. The evolution of the
law through administrative action may even reduce statutory or judicial
evolution of the law. Applying an evolutionary framework to administra-
tive actions creates a theory of administrative evolution of the law, placing
administrative analysis within the long tradition of evolutionary ap-
proaches to legal change. In contrast to traditional normative theories of
administrative law, an evolutionary approach focuses not on why adminis-
trative law changes, but rather on how that change progresses over time.
This theory of administrative evolution of the law also casts new light on a
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host of normative questions, from the role of judicial review to improve-
ments in agency decision-making. Considering administrative actions
within the broader context of the legal evolution promises a fruitful ap-
proach to analyzing administrative law.
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I. LAW EVOLVES. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN IT CAN’T?
LAW evolves.1 Law evolves to accommodate changes in societalgoals,2 physical conditions,3 cultural norms,4 technology,5 and sci-entific understanding.6 The common law evolves via judicial deci-
sions, constitutional law via amendment and judicial interpretation, and
statutory law via legislative revisions and judicial interpretation. This un-
derstanding of legal change is axiomatic,7 advanced by scholars from Ar-
istotle, Montesquieu, and Burke,8 to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.9
Evolutionary stories abound in the legal literature. Paradigmatic exam-
ples appear in water law (evolution of water rights),10 land use (evolution
1. See PETER STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION: THE STORY OF AN IDEA 125–27 (Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1980) (tracing the replacement of the natural law approach with the
evolutionary law approach to jurisprudence).
2. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in Order to
form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States
of America.”) (emphasis added).
3. John G. Sprankling, Property Law for the Anthropocene Era, 59 ARIZ. L. REV.
737, 744 (2017) (“It is axiomatic that physical conditions, such as geography and climate,
influence how law evolves.”).
4. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). Chief Justice Earl Warren said:
“The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Id.
5. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 202 (1977) (noting that “[t]he advent of automo-
biles, with the concomitant increase in the incidence of individuals causing injury in States
where they were not subject to in personam actions under Pennoyer, required further mod-
eration of the territorial limits on jurisdictional power.”).
6. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, The Endangered Species Act: Static Law Meets Dynamic
World, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 175, 213 (2010).
7. E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 38, 38 (1985) (“Today the idea that law ‘evolves’ is so deeply ingrained in Anglo-
American legal thought that most lawyers are no longer even conscious of it as a metaphor.
We speak of the law ‘adapting’ to its social, cultural, and technological environment with-
out the slightest awareness of the jurisprudential tradition we are invoking.”).
8. Id. at 39 n.4.
9. Oliver R. Goodenough, Cultural Replication Theory and Law: Proximate Mecha-
nisms Make a Difference, 30 VT. L. REV. 989, 991 (2006) (noting that “[o]ne of the most
noted proponents [of an evolutionary approach] in the U.S. tradition is Oliver Wendell
Holmes. Evolutionary thinking is a strong theme in The Common Law and an explicit one
in Law in Science and Science in Law.”); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, THE COMMON
LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963) (“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intu-
itions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with
their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the
rules by which men should be governed.”).
10. Joseph W. Dellapenna, United States: The Allocation of Surface Waters, in THE
EVOLUTION OF THE LAW AND POLITICS OF WATER 189, 189 (Joseph W. Dellapenna &
Joyeeta Gupta eds., 2009) (observing that “[t]he law of water allocation in the United
States provides examples of how water law evolves in response to differing patterns of
hydro-geological availability of water and of demand for water.”); see Coffin v. Left Hand
Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882) (remarking, on the riparian rights doctrine, that
“[i]mperative necessity, unknown to the countries which gave it birth, compels the recogni-
tion of another doctrine in conflict therewith.”).
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of fencing in/fencing out laws),11 family law (evolution of the common
law tort of seduction),12 torts (evolution of the economic loss rule),13 cor-
porate law (evolution of the corporate form),14 constitutional law (evolu-
tion of due process requirements),15 and many other fields.16 What drives
this legal evolution is an area of intense scholarly debate, with various
academic traditions advancing ideas from law as a reflection of evolving
society to economic efficiency,17 but the legal academy accepts that law
adapts to changing conditions.
Evolution of the law is something more specific than change over
time.18 An evolutionary approach explicitly analogizes the process of le-
gal change in reaction to environmental change to the biological theory of
evolution.19 As in biological evolution, an evolving legal system builds
itself over time, through rounds of lawmaking, with lawmakers choosing
laws from among many possible variants, more “fit” approaches surviving
and producing new variations, which inherit some characteristic from
prior generations of law.20 This adaptation of the law over time is thus
“an emergent property which spontaneously arises through the interac-
tion of simple components”: variation, selection, and inheritance.21
But what happens when a law cannot evolve? When a statute is hide-
bound by legislative divisions and so cannot change, despite radical
changes in relevant science and technology, physical setting, societal
needs, and cultural norms? Consider Eskridge and Ferejon’s Super-Stat-
ute Theory.22 They highlight a class of federal “super statutes,” which
become foundational to how the public perceives the governing struc-
tures and thus resist legislative efforts at reform.23 Examples include the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) of 1926, and
11. See Bernhard Grossfeld, Geography and Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1510, 1515–18
(1984).
12. See M.B.W. Sinclair, The Use of Evolution Theory in Law, 64 U. DET. L. REV. 451,
459–61 (1987).
13. See Anthony Niblett, Richard Posner & Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution of a Legal
Rule, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 354 (2010).
14. See Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci et al., The Emergence of the Corporate Form, 33 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 193, 193–94 (2017).
15. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning? On
Originalism, Due Process, Procedural Innovation . . . and Parking Tickets, 60 OKLA. L.
REV. 1, 52 (2007).
16. Elliott, supra note 7, at 45–62.
17. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEX. L. REV.
645, 646 (1985).
18. See id. at 647 (“Evolutionary jurisprudence refers only to those jurisprudential the-
ories that explicitly focus on legal change, or that make use of a particular model to explain
how legal change occurs.”).
19. See Elliott, supra note 7, at 39.
20. See Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative
Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 913, 921 (2005).
21. J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution
of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1442
(1996) (citing JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 339 (1987)).
22. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215,
1215–17 (2001).
23. See id. at 1229, 1237, 1260–61.
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the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973.24 Super statutes “penetrate
deeply into American norms or institutional practice” and become un-
changing monoliths in the legal landscape.25 Assuming law must by its
nature evolve to adapt to changing conditions, these super statutes should
create pent up demand for legal evolution—a growing need for the law to
adapt to meet changing conditions.26
Some may point to the courts as an outlet for these evolutionary pres-
sures, recognizing their longstanding role in interpreting statutes and the
common law in the light of “[t]he felt necessities of the time.”27 Certainly,
courts could fulfill an evolutionary role in administrative law, but the cur-
rent form of judicial review of agency decision-making limits the courts’
role.28 When undertaking arbitrary and capricious review of agency ac-
tion under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),29 for example, a
court must not “substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”30 Instead,
the reviewing court determines whether the agency acted within its au-
thority, whether its action was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,”31 and, finally, whether the
agency “action followed the necessary procedural requirements.”32 Like-
wise, when reviewing agency interpretations of the law under Chevron,
the reviewing court’s analysis begins by determining whether Congress
spoke directly to the issue at hand, and, if not, then proceeds by deferring
to the agency’s interpretation if it “is based on a permissible construction
of the statute.”33 When applying Chevron, “the court does not simply im-
pose its own construction on the statute.”34 “‘Congress, when it left ambi-
guity in a statute’ administered by an agency, ‘understood that the
ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and de-
sired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of
discretion the ambiguity allows.’”35 “The responsibility for assessing the
wisdom of . . . policy choices and resolving the struggle between compet-
ing views of the public interest are not judicial ones: ‘Our Constitution
vests such responsibilities in the political branches.’”36 Moreover, when a
court does find that an agency has violated the APA or misinterpreted a
statute, the proper remedy is generally to remand to the agency for re-
24. Id. at 1242–43.
25. Id. at 1215.
26. Or, perhaps, these super statutes are able to remain unchanging because most
evolution of the law has moved into the administrative state.
27. Holmes, supra note 9, at 5.
28. See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Our Illiberal Administrative Law, 10
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 475, 478–79 (2016).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
30. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
31. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
32. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 417.
33. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
34. Id.
35. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013) (citing Smiley v. Citibank, 517
U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996)).
36. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66 (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195
(1978)).
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consideration, not for the court to engage in even low-level decision-mak-
ing.37 In sum, then, a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for
that of the agency, may not impose a better reading of a statute on an
agency, and may not fashion its own solution when an agency errs. Within
these constraints, although the judiciary can reject an agency’s changes in
the law, the judiciary’s ability to effectuate its own evolution of the law is
severely limited.
On this understanding, then, both the legislatures and the courts have
largely abdicated their roles in evolving some major statutes. Over time,
this leads to pent up demand for change in these regimes. Where and how
does this evolutionary pressure find release?
This article theorizes that administrative law adapts to evolutionary
pressure through a process analogous to biological evolution, mediated
by administrative agencies. This analytical framework offers significant
lessons about the administrative state. By way of example, this article
shows that the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Services (FWS, together, the Services), the administra-
tive agencies charged with implementation of the Endangered Species
Act, have taken over many of the traditional legislative and judicial roles
in evolving the law. The process of change in the Act over time mimics
the processes at play in biological evolution.
A. SITUATING THE EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH
IN THE EXISTING LITERATURE
Analyzing administrative actions as a form of evolutionary change is a
relatively unexplored theoretical approach to administrative law, but the
scholarly field of administrative law is a busy one. In this crowded field, it
is essential to establish which ideas in this article are new and which are
not.
First, this article’s recognition of administrative agencies as the domi-
nant realm for legal action is not new. While the legal literature is largely
devoid of evolutionary analysis of administrative legal change, the litera-
ture recognizes administrative agencies’ important role in legal change.38
Prominent authors working in this realm include J.B. Ruhl,39 Jody Free-
37. See, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 905 (1984) (remanding an invalid
rulemaking or agency decision to the agency for reconsideration “best respects the con-
gressional scheme investing the Board and not the courts with broad powers to fashion
remedies that will effectuate national labor policy.”).
38. See, e.g., Jud Mathews, Minimally Democratic Administrative Law, 68 ADMIN. L.
REV. 605, 606–07 (2016) (“The volume of substantive policy choices made by modern
agencies in the United States is simply staggering.”). For several good environmental law
examples, see the recent collection of articles on resilience and the law including, Barbara
Cosens, Lance Gunderson, & Brian Chaffin, Introduction to the Special Feature Practicing
Panarchy: Assessing legal flexibility, ecological resilience, and adaptive governance in re-
gional water systems experiencing rapid environmental change, 23(1) ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 4,
9 (2018).
39. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regula-
tory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 762 (2003); Robin Kundis Craig
& J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1
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man and Jim Rossi,40 Emily Meazell,41 Robin Craig,42 and many, many
others.43 This article does not add much to this well-established view of
the role of administrative agencies in our modern world, although it does
explicitly make the case that the locus of legal change now lies within the
administrative realm. But this is not its primary focus; instead, this article
presents a workable theory for making sense of all of this administrative
legal change. This article is about how change within this administrative
realm occurs, given administrative law’s rise to prominence as the new
medium for most legal action.
Second, this article is not the first article to consider biological evolu-
tion as a framework for some forms of legal change. Prominent scholars
using this approach include E. Donald Elliott,44 M.B.W. Sinclair,45 Her-
bert Hovenkamp,46 J.B. Ruhl,47 and Ellen E. Sward.48 These scholars,
however, have focused on legislative and judicial evolution, not adminis-
trative evolution. The evolutionary theory of administrative law advo-
cated here updates the prior work for the administrative age. Viewing
administrative law as a medium for the continuing evolution of the law
places administrative legal change squarely in a long tradition of legal
evolution. Moreover, an evolutionary jurisprudence provides a rich foun-
dation for analyzing administrative decisions and decision-making.49
“[T]here is a connection between an evolutionary jurisprudence and legal
scholarship which is at once constructive and creative, critical and vigor-
ous . . . . This lays the jurisprudential foundation for the work of scholars
like Holmes, Corbin, and Wigmore, work which is both critical and crea-
tive.”50 Bringing a similar perspective to administrative lawmaking
should prove similarly useful.
Third, advancing a broad theory for administrative law is not new, al-
though the focus of this theory on the way administrative law changes is
unusual. Most theories of administrative law currently in vogue focus on
(2014); J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Services and the Clean Water Act: Strategies for Fitting New
Science into Old Laws, 40 ENVTL. L. 1381 (2010).
40. Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Improving Interagency Coordination in Shared Regula-
tory Space, 38 ADMIN. L. REG. L. NEWS 11, 11 (2013).
41. Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 1729–30 (2011).
42. Craig & Ruhl, supra note 39, at 18.
43. See, e.g., Hannah Gosnell et al., Transforming (perceived) rigidity in environmental
law through adaptive governance: a case of Endangered Species Act implementation, 22(4)
ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 42 (2017).
44. Elliott, supra note 7, at 38.
45. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 451–52.
46. Hovenkamp, supra note 17, at 645.
47. Ruhl, supra note 21, at 1408–09.
48. Ellen E. Sward, Justification and Doctrinal Evolution, 37 CONN. L. REV. 389, 392
(2004) (collecting citations).
49. Elliott, supra note 7, at 93 (“The striking thing about the scholars who have shared
an evolutionary approach to jurisprudence is that they have been among America’s most
creative legal scholars.”).
50. Id. at 93–94.
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justifying or invalidating the administrative state writ large51 and are the-
ories of agency legitimacy, not descriptive theories of change. The major
theories du jour—most notably the “political control” model52 and the
“deliberative model,”53 and older models like the “expertise model,”54
along with the many critiques of these models based on public choice
theory, anti-majoritarianism, accountability, agency capture, nondelega-
tion, overwhelming bureaucracy, and rule of law55—focus primarily on
normative debates about agencies and the role of the court in con-
straining agency actions.56 In contrast, the evolutionary approach to ad-
ministrative law advocated here is a theory of change, concerned with
how administrative agencies change the law over time, how those changes
are constrained, and what this model of administrative legal change
reveals. Few other scholars suggest a theory with this focus.57 Because of
its focus on explaining administrative changes in the law, an evolutionary
theory of administrative law is not inconsistent with other models of ad-
ministrative legal change, but rather provides a theoretical overlay to
those models that shifts the focus to agency outputs and away from
agency legitimacy and judicial review. The Supreme Court itself noted the
value of an evolutionary approach for administrative rulemaking: “[t]he
use by an administrative agency of the evolutional approach is particu-
larly fitting.”58 Although the focus here lies on understanding agency ac-
tions, this theory carries significant normative implications for traditional
notions of political accountability, authority, and judicial deference to
agency decision.
Fourth and finally, what is truly new in this article is the explicit analy-
sis of a biological evolutionary framework as applied to administrative
legal change. It is surprising that this is the first explicit consideration of
the applicability of an evolutionary framework in this context. As de-
scribed, many authors use evolution as a metaphor to describe legal
change generally, and many authors have debated the applicability of the
51. Many of these approaches fit nicely into the red light/green light dichotomy, long
used in international law circles. See CAROL HARLOW & RICHARD RAWLINGS, LAW AND
ADMINISTRATION 2 (Herbert S. Marks 1984). But for some reason, these approaches are
less in vogue among United States scholars. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law
in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presi-
dency, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1101, 1128 (1988).
52. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 38 (2009) (describing the rise to dominance of the political con-
trol model of administrative legitimacy).
53. See Glen Staszewski, Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy, and Administra-
tive Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 849, 858 (2012).
54. Watts, supra note 52, at 33.
55. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Why the Modern Administrative State Is Inconsistent
with the Rule of Law, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 491, 495 (2008).
56. No recent surveys of the theories in this field appear to exist. Such a survey is long
overdue.
57. But see Aaron L. Nielson, Visualizing Change in Administrative Law, 49 GA. L.
REV. 757, 759–60 (2015).
58. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 265 (1975) (quoting NLRB v. Seven-
Up Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349 (1953)).
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evolution metaphor to that general legal change, but the debate over the
applicability of the evolution metaphor to administrative law field is lack-
ing. Many authors also use the term evolution to describe administrative
legal change, but in most cases the authors appear to be using it “as sim-
ply synonymous with change.”59 A very few articles have used the evolu-
tionary metaphor to elucidate administrative lawmaking, but these
articles have done so without first considering whether biological evolu-
tion is an informative and applicable approach to understanding adminis-
trative law.60 The one exception appears to be a brief discussion in a
longer piece postulating several “natural laws” of administrative law.61
Few other works discussing evolutionary theories of legal development
even examine administrative legal change, focusing instead on judicial
and legislative mechanisms. Some from outside the community of legal
scholars touch on evolutionary approaches to administrative law,62 but
none of these works explain how administrative law demonstrates the
“self-assembly, selection, and emergence” necessary for an evolutionary
theory of legal change.63 Although some of these works nibble around
the edges of such a theory,64 they lack a firm theoretical foundation
59. William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Natural Law of Administrative Law, 48 MO. L.
REV. 101, 105 (1983); see, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, The Interplay Between Actors as a Determi-
nant of the Evolution of Administrative Law in International Institutions, 68 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 319, 322 (2005) (focusing on the development of a system of administrative law,
rather than on the mechanisms of legal change within such a system); Richard B. Stewart,
Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1805,
1805 (1978) (arguing that the Vermont Yankee decision stopped the development of new
procedural requirements for administrative agencies). Many similar sounding articles argue
for a sociobiological approach to law making, but do not address mechanisms of legal
change. See, e.g., Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction and Ap-
plication to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117, 1117 (1997) (exploring “the implications for
law of evolved behavioral predispositions in humans”).
60. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, The Coevolution of Administrative Law with Everything Else,
28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) (discussing the ongoing interplay between administrative
law and environmental law); 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR
AND WATER, at vi (1986); Robert Charles Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An
Essay in Statutory Evolution And Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90 (1977) (acknowledging that
administrative change has played an important role in the evolution of corporate tax cul-
ture, albeit without extensively examining administrative legal change); William H. Rod-
gers, Jr., Where Environmental Law and Biology Meet: Of Pandas’ Thumbs, Statutory
Sleepers, and Effective Law, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 25, 56–60 (1993); William H. Jr. Rodgers,
The Evolution of Cooperation in Natural Resources Law: The Drifter/Habitue´ Distinction,
38 U. FLA. L. REV. 195 (1986); see also Mark C. Niles, Punctuated Equilibrium: A Model
for Administrative Evolution, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 353, 359–60 (2011) (exploring the
idea of rapid change in administrative law over a short period in response to outside
events, albeit not using an evolutionary approach to explain the change); Joseph A.
Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria in the Evolution of United States Securities Regulation, 8
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 1 (2002) (taking the same approach).
61. Rodgers, supra note 59, at 105.
62. See, e.g., Rachel Hilliard, Conflicting Views: Neoclassical, Porterian, and Evolu-
tionary Approaches to the Analysis of the Environmental Regulation of Industrial Activity,
38 J. ECON. ISSUES 509 (2004); Bruce L. Benson, Regulatory Disequilibrium and Ineffi-
ciency: The Case of Interstate Trucking, 15 REV. AUSTRIAN ECONS. 229 (2002).
63. Hornstein, supra note 20, at 921.
64. Hovenkamp, supra note 17, at 650 (“The high points of the great Darwinian evolu-
tionary tradition in jurisprudence were produced by people who no longer debated the
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showing the validity of such an approach.
A very few commentators consider administrative change through the
lens of adaptive complexity theory,65 which shares some perspectives with
an evolutionary approach. J.B. Ruhl, one of the few writers to address
legal evolution and administrative agencies, has written extensively in this
area. Although much of his work focuses on the ability of administrative
agencies to adapt to changing regulatory needs, he suggests that the ad-
ministrative state serves a bar to a truly adaptive or effective system of
environmental law.66 These important works also do not address a com-
prehensive theory of administrative legal change.67 Professor Donald T.
Hornstein has begun to explore complexity theory and administrative
change,68 but his work has not addressed mechanisms or examples of ad-
ministrative evolution.69 Professor Hornstein provides a helpful overview
of some other theoretical approaches to administrative law, and explains
how complexity theory can enhance those approaches, but he does not
propound a functional theory of administrative evolution.70
In some ways, the lack of analysis is unremarkable. In the modern ad-
ministrative state, we expect the legislature to pass laws that leave the
details up to administrative agencies. Perhaps we just expect that agencies
will engage in a continuing process of making and remaking laws and that
this will follow the broader evolutionary trajectory observed in the law.
But the literature does not examine how this happens. Indeed, most
scholars seem to simply assume evolution of the law via administrative
action, without actually making that framework explicit.71
Understanding what evolution of the law means in an administrative
setting, however, requires just such an explicit setting out and analysis of
the evolutionary theory itself. Only by making underlying assumptions
explicit can we open them up for analysis. In a biological context, evolu-
tion is a freighted term, carrying a long history and implying myriad
mechanisms, strengths, and constraints. Evolution is good at producing
mechanism of natural selection as fueling the theory of evolution. These jurisprudents as-
sumed it, often implicitly.”).
65. Hornstein, supra note 20, at 915 (suggesting that “new insights really could be
gained by seeing in the administrative state the overarching tendencies of a complex, adap-
tive system”).
66. J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to
Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV.
933, 939 (1997); J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law in Modern Admin-
istrative States: Using Complexity Theory to Reveal the Diminishing Returns and Increasing
Risks the Burgeoning of Law Poses to Society, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405, 452 (1997); J.B.
Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A
Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J.
849, 913 (1996).
67. See supra note 66.
68. See, e.g., Hornstein, supra note 20, at 960 (“[R]egulatory environments . . . might
share the tendencies of complex adaptive systems.”).
69. Id. at 921.
70. See id.
71. See, e.g., Hornstein, supra note 20, at 921; Hovenkamp, supra note 17, at 615; Ruhl,
supra note 21, at 1416, 1418.
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some outcomes (populations adapted to the immediate conditions, for ex-
ample), but very poor at producing other outcomes (globally “best” solu-
tions, predictable outcomes, and changes in traits with weak linkages to
reproductive success, for example). How much of this history and context
do administrative law scholars imply when we casually mention evolution
of administrative rules? How much of the theoretical work around bio-
logical evolution could we build on if we bring evolution into administra-
tive analysis in a robust and explicit way? This article begins to address
these questions, in hopes that future articles can develop this approach
more fully.
Broadly, “[A]dministrative law’s complexity makes it hard to see the
big picture . . . [t]he regulatory state has many moving parts, making it
challenging to appreciate how they all fit together, much less how the
overall structure is changing[,] or rather, not changing.”72 But this kind of
broad look is essential to understanding how a body of administrative law
changes over time, and an evolutionary theory of administrative law of-
fers the broad perspective that may be useful to others taking a sweeping
view of administrative legal change.
Section II of this article validates its approach to legal evolution and
choice of study system, the Endangered Species Act. Section III provides
case studies of three aspects of the Act: (1) the evolution of the definition
of species that may be listed under the Act, based on changes in popula-
tion science; (2) the evolution of the Safe Harbor Program, based on the
burgeoning property rights movement; and (3) the evolution of the exper-
imental population as a mechanism of species reintroduction to better
reflect developing societal needs. These case studies demonstrate how ad-
ministrative changes in the interpretation and execution of the Act reveal
a form of legal evolution. Section IV makes tentative normative sugges-
tions based on this evolutionary approach to administrative law. Finally,
Section V briefly concludes.
II. THE APPROACH AND STUDY SYSTEM
A. EVOLUTIONARY APPROACHES TO LEGAL CHANGE
Undertaking this inquiry requires a precise definition of evolution of
law, lest any change over time in the administration of a statute be swept
up in the definition. Not every theory of legal change builds on an evolu-
tionary approach.73 Biological evolutionary models require three basic
mechanisms: variation, selection acting on that variation, and inheritance
of selected traits.74 Individuals within a population exhibit variation so
72. Nielson, supra note 57, at 758.
73. Elliott, supra note 7, at 39 n.4 (“Many legal writers, including Aristotle, Montes-
quieu, and Burke, have expressed ideas similar to those in the evolutionary tradition with-
out drawing explicit analogies to the theory of evolution in biology.”).
74. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 454 (“Theories of evolution typically have three basic
components: a theory of variation, a theory of selection, and a theory of transmission or
retention.”).
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that some individuals are a better fit for their environment (variation).
The more fit individuals survive to reproduce at a higher rate (selection),
and then their more numerous offspring exhibit some of the same traits
that made their parents more fit to their environment (inheritance).
Lather, rinse, repeat—over time, given a relatively consistent landscape,
a population of organisms will evolve toward a higher degree of fitness,
better able to survive and reproduce in that environment. This Darwinian
evolution produces adaptive changes over generations.
Darwin’s approach was revolutionary not merely because he suggested
that species evolved over time, but rather because he proposed this set of
mechanisms, abstracted from the underlying biology,75 that accounted for
self-guided adaptation over time. Indeed, even in a world that knew noth-
ing of genes or other mechanisms of inheritance, Darwin could “formu-
late simple, powerful statements at higher levels of abstraction about the
patterns of change that result from these forces.”76
In its infancy, evolutionary theory found more acceptance and led to
more development in the social sciences than in biology. The mechanisms
producing variation, selection, and inheritance seemed much more self-
evident in the social sciences, at least at a broad scale:
The history of ideas . . . needed no such mechanism to complete its
theory of evolution. The fact that ideas are a product of human crea-
tivity, thrown into the cultural pot more-or-less randomly and often
created precisely because they are novel, could explain cultural
change. Furthermore, both the strength of tradition and inherent
human conservatism, which prefers successful old ideas over untried
new ones, explained “cultural inheritance” better than any nine-
teenth century theory of biological inheritance.77
The parallels to legal change are unavoidable. Legislatures, courts, crea-
tive attorneys, and legal commentators spin out never-ending variations
on the law, writing, endorsing, or arguing for new legal rules.78 Some of
these rules “survive” over time, succeeding based on their ability to meet
societal needs.79 Success comes in the form of spreading to other jurisdic-
tions, surviving new legal challenges, reducing costs, or achieving the
law’s own aims.80 And the laws proposed by the legal community tend
toward variations on existing laws, based on common law constraints, a
75. Elliott, supra note 7, at 90 (“Evolutionary theories . . . may be used to describe the
nature and direction of changes in a complex phenomenon even though little is known
about its constituent parts and the mechanisms connecting them.”).
76. Id. Nevertheless, the lack of a mechanistic explanation for Darwinian evolution
slowed its acceptance until the rediscovery of Mendelian genetics in 1900. See THE EVOLU-
TIONARY SYNTHESIS: PERSPECTIVES ON THE UNIFICATION OF BIOLOGY x–xi (Ernst Mayr
& William B. Provine eds., 1998). This was until the collision of Mendelism, population
genetics, and evolution led to the great synthesis in the 1930s and 1940s, which laid the
foundation for most of modern biology. See id. at xii-xiii; JULIAN HUXLEY, EVOLUTION:
THE MODERN SYNTHESIS 47 (1942).
77. Hovenkamp, supra note 17, at 648.
78. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 456–58.
79. Id. at 458.
80. Id. at 456–58.
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general trend toward legal conservatism, a lack of imagination, or other
factors.81 In an evolutionary legal framework, the law evolves to become
a better and better fit to the needs of society through this iterative
process.
At their best, theories of legal evolution draw on the well-developed
theories of biological evolution,82 while remaining highly cognizant of the
myriad differences between the two and the traps these differences lay
for the unwary analyst. To bare the bones of the analysis, here follows an
explicit discussion of the proposed model of evolution in administrative
law. In the evolutionary theory of administrative law proposed here,
some of the relatively intangible mechanisms in law for variation, selec-
tion, and inheritance can be made more explicit.83
1. Legal Variation, Selection, and Inheritance
First, variation. Variation in administrative interpretations of the law
come from many sources, including the executive and legislative branches
and the public, particularly special interest organizations. Agencies are an
arm of the executive, and new administrations bring a new perspective on
a host of issues committed to agency discretion. “A change in administra-
tion brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly reason-
able basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits
of its programs and regulations.”84 Congress also brings significant new
ideas and political pressure to bear on administrative agencies, often
through congressional hearings, creating potential new variations in
agency actions.85 Further, agencies respond to public demand for
rulemakings, whether that demand comes via a petition for rulemaking or
a lawsuit, as in Massachusetts v. EPA.86 Agencies also seek out new vari-
ants by requesting public participation in the administrative process
through workshops87 or the notice and comment and hearing require-
ments of the APA and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).88
Agencies must meaningfully engage with the public comments they re-
81. Id.
82. Ruhl, supra note 21, at 1415 (“[W]here legal theory has progressed on the question
of evolution of law, this progression is in no small measure a remarkable mirror image of
the refinement of evolutionary biology from Darwin to the Ecosystem Age.”).
83. See Sinclair, supra note 12, at 454.
84. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 59
(1983).
85. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 523 (2009) (“[T]he precise pol-
icy change at issue [in FCC v. Fox] was spurred by significant political pressure from
Congress.”).
86. 549 U.S. 497, 497 (2007). First, “a group of 19 private organizations filed a
rulemaking petition asking EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor
vehicles under § 202 of the Clean Air Act.” Id. at 510 (internal quotation marks omitted).
When the agency denied the petition, a collation of petitioners filed suit. See id. at 514.
87. See, e.g., Maine v. Norton, 257 F. Supp. 2d 357, 378–79 (D. Me. 2003).
88. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6
(2017).
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ceive, ensuring consideration of a wide range of policy variation.89 Alto-
gether, these sources produce the rich variation at the heart of
administrative evolution of the law.
Second, selection. Selection acts on variation in several ways, selecting
the more fit variants for survival. At the outset, this requires determining
what makes an administrative interpretation “fit.” Just as a fit organism is
defined as one that survives and reproduces, a fit administrative interpre-
tation is one that survives to promulgation and beyond, eventually spawn-
ing new interpretations that carry the core approach forward.90 Selection
acts on administrative action in two distinct ways. Ultimately, agencies
decide which actions to execute (via rulemakings, policy statements, deci-
sions, and the many other administrative possibilities), and these deci-
sions select those policy variants that will survive.91 Courts may also act
to eliminate some policy options, through decisions striking down agency
actions or statutory interpretations. Finally, the legislature sometimes acts
directly to change or call back an agency action, again eliminating some
administrative actions. Through agencies, courts, and the legislature, se-
lection pares off less fit administrative interpretations of the law.92
More broadly, the agencies, legislature, and to a lesser extent the
courts, are responsive to sources of selective pressure that shape their
decision-making. Many of the same entities that suggest policy variants
also lobby for these options, which shapes administrative decision-mak-
ing. After the agency promulgates a regulation, the regulation faces ongo-
ing selective political pressure from several sources, including the public,
89. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203 (2015) (“An agency must
consider and respond to significant comments received during the period for public
comment.”).
90. This risks a tautology in detecting whether administrative evolution of the law
does in fact occur. Elliott, supra note 7, at 93. If the best laws are defined as those that are
most likely to survive, and the evidence that they are the best is likewise that they have in
fact survived, analysis devolves into a Panglossian view of the world, holding that “[t]hings
cannot be otherwise than as they are; . . . all is necessarily for the best end.” VOLTAIRE,
CANDIDE 3 (Bonland Liveright, Inc. 1918). But, as discussed below, an evolutionary ap-
proach does not presume that the law at present is the best or highest form of the law.
Evolution is an emphatically nonteleological process. Hovenkamp, supra note 17, at 671.
Evolution produces a tree with many branches, not a path toward a particular pinnacle.
Likewise, legal evolution need not produce better, cleaner, or more developed solutions
over time. And because the selective legal environment is likely to undergo continuous
changes, sometimes in response to changes in the law itself, legal evolution does not move
the law toward any particular endpoint. Ruhl, supra note 21, at 1459–60.
91. This first form of selective pressure—the conscious decisions of the agency about
which interpretation to choose—raises a potential pitfall in the comparison to biological
evolution. Biological evolution, by its nature, depends on random variation. This is a key
component of evolution, separating it from intelligent design or other guided forms of
adaptation over time. Species do not choose how they evolve, while regulatory agencies do.
Ruhl, supra note 21, at 1450–51. This does not invalidate the evolutionary model for the
study of law. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 456. The basic machinery of the evolutionary pro-
cess persists.
92. But see Ruhl, supra note 21, at 1451 (“Fitness of laws, just as for species, is mea-
sured in terms of how successful the law is in meeting its goals.”). This approach to measur-
ing the fitness of a law does not appear to account for the broader way commentators often
discuss the evolution of the law, as a series of changes from one law to the next.
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the legislature via hearings or other communications, from unsuccessful
court challenges, and from the rest of the executive branch. When these
political pressures mount, they can drive the agency to reverse course and
change the action.
Selection, then, comes directly though administrative actions, judicial
decisions affecting those actions, and, rarely, legislative changes to ad-
ministrative actions. It comes indirectly through all the assorted selective
pressures that affect these direct selection mechanisms.
Third, inheritance. In biological systems, inheritance has two primary
effects: it increases the chances that adaptive traits are maintained in a
population and constrains the range of possible adaptions that a new gen-
eration of offspring is likely to exhibit. Because the variation in a popula-
tion springs from (generally) minor alterations in inherited genetic
information, each new generation is more or less limited in the potential
range of variation it may exhibit. This constraint is termed path depen-
dence—existing traits are a product of selection acting on what came
before.93 Two mechanisms in administrative law similarly limit the range
of variation a given administrative action can exhibit and ensure that suc-
cessive generations of administrative law are not too far removed from
past agency actions: first, statutory limits, and second, challenges to
changes in agency practices.
In the primary mechanism, agencies are constrained by the very stat-
utes that give them their power. Agencies are creatures of limited power,
able to operate only within the bounds of their organic acts or other legis-
lative devolutions of power. With regard to agency power, “the determi-
native question is . . . what Congress has said it can do.”94 When a statute
provides a definition of a term, for example, an agency can build on that
definition, altering it through explication via rulemakings, but they can-
not promulgate a definition not “based on a permissible construction of
the statute.”95 Similarly, an agency can create a program based on the
power it is provided by a statute, but it cannot do so in a way that contra-
venes the underlying statute. Thus, statutes limit the range of possible
variation in administrative rulemakings, and regulatory definitions inherit
the limitations of the statute. These are broad constraints that inhere in
the power of the agencies themselves.
For the secondary mechanism, courts place some limits on changes
from one administrative action to the next, beyond the general trend to-
ward legal conservatism common to all areas of the law.96 “[A]n
‘[u]nexplained inconsistency’ in agency policy is ‘a reason for holding an
interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency prac-
93. Richard R. Nelson, Recent Evolutionary Theorizing About Economic Change, 33 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 48, 50–51 (1995) (“[T]he process of evolution is strongly path depen-
dent and there is no unique selection equilibrium. Any ‘optimizing’ characteristics of what
exists therefore must be understood as local and myopic”).
94. Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316, 322 (1961).
95. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
96. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 456–58.
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tice.’ An arbitrary and capricious regulation of this sort is itself unlaw-
ful.”97 Although precedent imposes no “requirement that all agency
change be subjected to more searching review,”98 the Supreme Court
does require an agency to provide additional explanation for the
change.99 Moreover, the Supreme Court has imposed heightened justifi-
cation requirements for some agency actions that deviate from historic
practices.100 For instance, when prior policies create reliance interests101
and when new actions “rest[ ] upon factual findings that contradict those
which underlay [the agency’s] prior policy,”102 the decision faces height-
ened review. More broadly, the definitive quantitative study of judicial
review of agency decisions found that “long-standing agency interpreta-
tions prevailed under all deference regimes combined at a much higher
rate (82.3%) than . . . those that were inconsistent with a prior interpreta-
tion (59.8%).”103 This creates a strong incentive for agencies not to devi-
ate markedly from their past practices.
Taken together, these two mechanisms—the statutory constraints on
agency actions and the additional requirements imposed on agencies
making diametric changes from past agency practices—create a powerful
force that fulfills in administrative legal evolution the same functions in-
heritance fulfills in biological evolution.
Although these three mechanisms (variation, selection, and inheri-
tance) seem to present a plausible setting for the administrative evolution
of the law, the precise mechanisms themselves matter less than whether
the system functions in a way that achieves an evolutionary result. Dar-
win’s evolution focused on “simple, powerful statements at higher levels
of abstraction about the patterns of change that result from these
forces,”104 not the mechanisms that permitted evolution. In the same
way, when legal scholars “describe legal evolution without defining pre-
cisely why some legal doctrines are ‘stronger’ than others, they are not
abusing evolutionary metaphors.”105 Instead, these scholars “use an
unique aspect of the power of evolutionary models to make relatively
refined statements at an abstract level when little is known about the de-
terminants of specific cases.”106 Getting bogged down in precise details
97. Encino Motorcars, L.L.C. v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016) (citing Nat’l
Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005)).
98. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514 (2004) (emphasis added).
99. The agency must “display awareness that it is changing position.” Id. at 515. It
must also “show that there are good reasons for the new policy. But it need not demon-
strate to a court’s satisfaction that the reasons for the new policy are better than the rea-
sons for the old one.” Id.
100. See Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, MICH. L.
REV. 1239, 1307 n.347 (2017).
101. Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2126.
102. See FCC, 556 U.S. at 515; see also Metzger & Stack, supra note 100, at 1307 n.347.
103. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 8 (2017).
104. Elliott, supra note 7, at 90.
105. Id. at 91.
106. Id.
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leads to unhelpful wheel-spinning,107 not meaningful theories that serve
the core function of evolutionary approaches to jurisprudence: to “chal-
lenge us to consider human nature, and the relationships between human
beings and the environment as they really are.”108 The more important
test for an evolutionary theory of administrative law, then, is not whether
the system as a whole has identifiable mechanisms for variation, selec-
tion, and inheritance (although identifiable mechanisms are certainly a
positive), but rather whether the system behaves in a way akin to an evo-
lutionary system.
2. Identifying Evolutionary Change
So, then, how can one recognize evolutionary lawmaking? One could
simply assume it to be self-evident,109 arguably a weak link when building
a theory of administrative evolution of the law. Instead, the mechanisms
of biological evolution suggest several indicators of evolution. For exam-
ple, evolution is iterative, usually based on a series of small steps. Evolu-
tionary change, as typically discussed in legal circles, involves changes
that make the law more fit in small steps—iterative changes toward im-
proved fitness. Similarly, administrative evolution should exhibit iterative
changes in the law in response to selective pressures in the administrative
environment.110 Administrative actions that exhibit these characteristics
provide evidence agencies are enacting evolution of the law.
Further, evolutionary change is unique in that it is path dependent—it
must build on and be constrained by prior adaptations. These require-
ments give rise to certain surprising outcomes that themselves serve as
indicators of an evolutionary system. For example, because evolutionary
change is iterative and path dependent, it does not necessarily lead to
ideal solutions, but rather the best solution given the current
arrangement.
Evolution is like a ladybug trying to get to a high point to take off.
Ladybugs march in one direction, uphill, until they can no longer go up-
hill, and then they take off. At best, this gets a ladybug to the highest
point in an uphill direction, but it does not guarantee that the ladybug
will get to the highest point around. In other words, the ladybug reaches a
local maximum, but not necessarily a global one. Uphill marches are effi-
cient for finding the nearest high point, but they are unlikely to lead to
the highest high point—where you end up depends entirely on where you
start. Similarly, evolution of traits under selection generally progresses
107. Hovenkamp, supra note 17, at 662 (noting the tendency of “Darwinian social sci-
ence . . . to lapse into dry, complicated, and endless classification schemes.”).
108. Elliott, supra note 7, at 94.
109. Hovenkamp, supra note 17, at 649–50.
110. Ruhl, supra note 21, at 1412 (“The answer is not as simple as pointing out that
legislatures pass new legislation, courts decide new case principles, and agencies promul-
gate new regulations. Those institutions could do that all day long every day and not move
the community one iota closer to fitness; indeed, regression into stasis or chaos would be
more likely.”). For a discussion of contrasts between evolutionary and non-evolutionary
paradigms, see Nelson, supra note 93.
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toward higher fitness. Organisms do not evolve to be a perfect fit for their
environment, but rather to be the best possible fit given where they are at
the start. Even though legal evolution has some human direction, and
humans can be more deliberate about their legal wanderings, if evolution
describes some significant part of the mechanism of legal change, we
should find law occupying local maxima—legal solutions that are the best
outcome given the parameters at the start of the evolutionary process,
but not necessarily the best possible outcome overall.111
Similarly, this aspect of evolution’s operation also leads to artifacts like
the panda’s thumb. Noted biologist Stephen Jay Gould explains that the
historical panda’s thumb evolved to become part of its paw, unable to
function as a normal thumb because the panda did not benefit from hav-
ing a thumb at that point in its history.112 Later, as the panda began to
specialize in eating bamboo, it once again required a thumb, but its old
thumb was “too specialized for a different function to become an opposa-
ble, manipulating digit.”113 Eventually, the panda evolved a sixth digit, a
new thumb, from an enlarged wrist bone, allowing it to easily manipulate
its bamboo stalks.114 In evolution more broadly, a “panda’s thumb” refers
to something old pressed into service in a new and unexpected way, be-
cause previous evolution has precluded more optimal solutions. These
mad scrabble solutions are significant evidence of evolution, more so than
organisms where all the parts “fit.” “Odd arrangements and funny solu-
tions are the proof of evolution—paths that a sensible God would never
tread but that natural process, constrained by history, follows per-
force.”115 In the evolutionary law context, this is akin to finding legal ap-
proaches pressed into service in new or unexpected ways. Professor
Sinclair notes “[i]t is not difficult to find the kind of data that illustrate
legal evolution. . . . Whenever one finds a legal fiction, one has found the
kind of jury-rigged adaptation that characterizes evolutionary phenom-
ena.”116 In an administrative law context, a panda’s thumb could be anal-
ogous to administrative actions built on shaky or nonexistent statutory
footings. Other commentators have observed the role of path depen-
dence in shaping regulations in some legal fields.117 Such an action may
press a statute into service in a way Congress never intended, because the
action must build on the inherited legal framework.
111. Ruhl, supra note 21, at 1411–12.
112. See STEPHEN J. GOULD, THE PANDA’S THUMB: MORE REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL
HISTORY 24 (1980).
113. Id.
114. Jane Qiu, How the Panda’s ‘Thumb’ Evolved Twice, NATURE (Jan. 16, 2017),
https://www.nature.com/news/how-the-panda-s-thumb-evolved-twice-1.21300 [http://perma
.cc/9JJ9-F28A].
115. GOULD, supra note 112, at 20–21.
116. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 475.
117. Hornstein, supra note 20, at 928 (“Other legal scholars are also beginning to use
the insights of sensitivity to initial conditions and path dependence to analyze particular
areas of statutory and administrative law such as securities law, environmental regulation,
and banking law.”).
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Ultimately, Professor Elliot suggests “it would be a fundamental mis-
take to evaluate evolutionary theories of jurisprudence as true or
false. . . . Instead, we should judge evolutionary jurisprudence as we judge
any creation myth, by whether it is useful.”118 This is an instrumentalist
approach to understanding evolutionary legal theories, which focuses on
whether a theoretical approach yields useful results, not whether it is
strictly “true” in some kind of realist sense. He argues “the evolutionary
tradition does not dictate a single definite theory of law; at most, an evo-
lutionary approach to law creates a context, a distinctive kind of conver-
sational setting, within which dialogue about law may occur.”119 This
article endeavors then, not to provide all the evidence necessary to prove
up the concept of administrative evolution of the law, but at least enough
evidence to provide the ongoing administrative law dialogue with a new
and productive conversational setting. This setting does not explain all
the reasons agencies do the things they do, but rather it helps to explain
the constraints on the way the agencies do those things. As Professor Sin-
clair noted in his seminal critique of evolutionary approaches to the law,
“[i]f all goes well this will throw a new light on the development of an
area of the law, how it reached its present state, and how it might change
in the future.”120
B. THE ESA AS A STUDY SYSTEM
1. Introduction to the ESA
Congress created the ESA in 1973 to provide for the conservation of
ecosystems vital to endangered and threatened species, to conserve the
species themselves, and to fulfill the United States’ duties under interna-
tional endangered species treaties.121 The Act’s significant protections
make it “the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of en-
dangered species ever enacted by any nation.”122 The Act has decreased
extinctions,123 and listed species are more likely to be improving than
declining.124 These accomplishments are not without costs: estimates vary
from $3.5 billion over an eleven-year period to $3.5 billion per year.125
To garner protection, a species must first be listed as threatened or en-
dangered under Section 4.126 Once a species is listed as endangered, it
receives the Act’s full protection.127 Threatened species do not automati-
118. Elliott, supra note 7, at 92–93.
119. Id. at 93.
120. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 451.
121. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2012).
122. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
123. Mark W. Schwartz, The Performance of the Endangered Species Act, 39 ANN. REV.
ECOLOGY, EVOLUTION & SYSTEMATICS 279, 291 (2008).
124. Id. at 292.
125. Randy T. Simmons & Kimberly Frost, Accounting for Species: The True Costs of
the Endangered Species Act, PERC (April 1, 2004), available at https://www.perc.org/wp-
content/uploads/old/esa_costs.pdf.
126. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2012).
127. Id. § 1538(a)(1).
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cally receive the same protections but rather only the protections the Ser-
vices “deem[ ] necessary and advisable to provide for the conservation of
such species.”128
The protections of the Act are largely bestowed by Sections 7 and 9.129
Section 9 bars the “take” of “any endangered species of fish or wild-
life,”130 which is defined very broadly to include “to harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage
in any such conduct.”131 With the blessing of the Supreme Court, the Ser-
vices have further broadened this definition to capture damage to listed
species’ habitat, by defining harm to “include significant habitat modifica-
tion or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by signifi-
cantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding
or sheltering.”132 The take prohibition applies to “any . . . entity subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States,” including both state govern-
ments and the federal government itself.133
The federal government further restricts its own activities through Sec-
tion 7(a)(2) of the ESA, which requires that “[e]ach Federal agency . . .
insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency
. . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modi-
fication of [critical] habitat of such species.”134 In order to meet this re-
quirement, agencies are required to consult with the expert Service for
any action that “may affect listed species or critical habitat.”135 Based on
the consultation, the relevant expert agency will issue a biological opinion
(BiOp) determining whether or not the Federal action “is likely to jeop-
ardize the continued existence of listed species or result in the destruction
or adverse modification of critical habitat.”136 The BiOp provides an inci-
dental take statement (ITS) that exempts any associated take from the
Section 9 take prohibitions.137 The BiOp and ITS may include mitigation
requirements or other conservation measures.138
Taken together, Sections 7 and 9 impose significant restraints on both
public and private actions that could imperil listed species, subject to the
permits and exceptions outlined in Section 10.139 Section 9 directly per-
128. Id. § 1533(d). FWS has, by default, extended the full protections of the Act to all
listed threatened species under its jurisdiction, Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and
Plants, 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.40–48 (2017), while NMFS grants such protection on a species-by-
species basis. Id. § 222.307(a).
129. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536, 1538 (2012).
130. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B).
131. Id. § 1532(19).
132. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2017); see Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great
Or., 515 U.S. 687, 715 (1995).
133. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(13), 1538(a)(1)(B) (2012).
134. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
135. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a).
136. Id. § 402.14(g)(4).
137. Id. § 402.14(i).
138. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (2012).
139. Id. § 1539.
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tains to all private actors, via its broad take prohibitions, and it has no
inherent exemptions.140 Section 7 directly addresses only federal actions,
but indirectly constrains private actions through its inclusion of actions
authorized or funded by federal agencies.141 Permits to fill wetlands, for
example, are generally granted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
under Section 404 of the CWA,142 and these permitting decisions all re-
quire compliance with Section 7 of the ESA.143 Sections 4, 7, and 9 pro-
vide the majority of the ESA’s restrictions, and the administrative
evolutions discussed in detail below build on and reshape that body of
law.
2. The Case for the ESA as a Study in Administrative Evolution
The ESA provides an ideal study system for documenting the growing
importance of administrative agencies in facilitating the evolution of the
law due to the Act’s statutory stagnancy, its heavy reliance on science, the
power granted to the Services by the Act, and its controversial nature. An
unchanging Act, a setting rife with selective pressures, and administrative
agencies empowered to change the way the Act work should provide fer-
tile ground for administrative evolution of the law.
First, the law itself has remained largely unchanged since the early
1980s, more than thirty-five years ago.144 Most of the major provisions of
the Act were established with its passage in 1973, although amendments
in 1978145 and 1982146 made significant alterations. Because the ESA is
largely locked into its current statutory form,147 the textual basis of the
law has not undergone significant evolution for some time. This means
that any significant changes to the law itself must come either through the
courts or administrative evolution of the law. With courts largely avoiding
the policy debates around the ESA, the Services provide the only remain-
ing outlet for evolution of the Act.
Second, during this thirty-five-year period, scientific understanding of
endangered species has undergone a revolution.148 In the field of genetics
alone, scientific progress has been nothing short of miraculous. In the
140. Id. § 1538(a)(1).
141. Id. § 1536(a).
142. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012).
143. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(3)(B) (2012).
144. Doremus, supra note 6, at 182 (noting that “the key features of the [ESA] have
proved surprisingly politically resilient.”).
145. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751
(adding the “God Squad,” consultation, incidental take, and critical habitat provisions).
146. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1411
(adding protections for plants, experimental populations, and best available science re-
quirements, among other changes).
147. See History of the Endangered Species Act, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
History_of_the_Endangered_Species_Act [http://perma.cc/VA33-P37P] (last visited Nov.
5, 2018).
148. Michael O’Connell, Response to: “Six Biological Reasons Why the Endangered
Species Act Doesn’t Work and What to Do About It,” 6 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 140, 140
(1992).
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1960s, scientists were determining which three-nucleotide codons in a nu-
cleic acid sequence specified which single amino acid.149 By 1999, re-
searchers had decoded the first human chromosome.150 And by 2011, of
relevance to the Act, researchers published a map of the rainbow trout
genome.151 These genetic advances gave managers huge amounts of in-
formation about the species they managed.152 Two reputable new jour-
nals dedicated to the use of genetic information in conservation decisions,
Molecular Ecology and Conservation Genetics, began in the late 1990s
and early 2000s “serv[ing] as evidence of the burgeoning discipline.”153
These scientific developments are particularly meaningful because the
Act values science so highly. The ESA requires myriad decisions under
the Act be based on the best available science.154 This makes the imple-
mentation of the Act hinge on the current state of science and so these
scientific developments have led to many legal challenges and significant
changes in the Act’s implementation. Because science has progressed so
rapidly since passage of the Act, the Act had to evolve to capitalize on
the new science. The Act is set up as a perfect test case for administrative
evolution.
Third, courts rely on the Act’s wildly ambitious language to grant the
Services broad latitude in implementing it,155 which encourages the Ser-
vices to use their power to develop the Act. The Act seeks “to provide a
means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend may be conserved, to provide a program for
the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species, and
to”156 implement relevant international treaties and conventions.157 The
Act requires that “all Federal departments and agencies shall seek to con-
serve endangered species and threatened species and shall utilize their
149. The History of DNA Timeline, DNA WORLDWIDE, https://www.dna-worldwide
.com/resource/160/history-dna-timeline [http://perma.cc/4RVA-29GA] (last visited Nov. 5,
2018).
150. Id.
151. Yniv Palti et al., A First Generation Integrated Map of the Rainbow Trout Genome,
10 BMC GENOMICS 462, 462 (2009), https://bmcgenomics.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/
10.1186/1471-2164-12-180 [http://perma.cc/M49D-ZVFF].
152. See Doremus, supra note 6, at 176, for a detailed discussion of the changes in sci-
ence and their impacts on the ESA.
153. Sylvia M. Fallon, Genetic Data and the Listing of Species Under the U.S. Endan-
gered Species Act, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1186, 1187 (2007).
154. The Act requires listing decisions, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2012); critical
habitat decisions, id. § 1533(b)(2); and interagency consultations, id. § 1536(a)(2), must be
made based on the best scientific data available. International treaty determinations, id.
§ 1537a(c)(2), and experimental population determinations, id. § 1539(j)(2)(B), must be
made based on the best available information.
155. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 703–04
(1995) (“The latitude the ESA gives the Secretary in enforcing the statute, together with
the degree of regulatory expertise necessary to its enforcement, establishes that we owe
some degree of deference to the Secretary’s reasonable interpretation” of the statutory
scheme.).
156. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2012).
157. Id.
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authorities in furtherance of the purposes of [the Act].”158 In essence, the
ESA dedicates the significant resources of the administrative state to pro-
tecting biodiversity. This kind of lofty language would be easy to wave
off, but for the case law giving life to the Act’s overarching value system.
The Supreme Court set the tone for interpreting the ESA in the
landmark Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill.159 There, the Court held
that the Act “admits of no exception,”160 “that Congress intended endan-
gered species to be afforded the highest of priorities,”161 and finally that
“Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly
clear that the balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered
species the highest of priorities.”162 From the legislative history, the
Court noted an “overriding need to devote whatever effort and resources
were necessary to avoid further diminution of national and worldwide
wildlife resources.”163 Tennessee Valley Authority’s broad and aggressive
reading of the ESA continues to give the Services significant flexibility to
achieve its aims.
Fourth and finally, the Services face intense and opposing public pres-
sure to both aggressively protect species and to avoid economic harm.
Michael Bean characterized the two primary forces at play:
The environmental camp . . . has argued that the existing law must be
strengthened, that it is not accomplishing its vitally important goal of
conserving rare species as effectively as it must if it is to stave off a
flood of extinctions. The other camp has argued that the existing law
is unduly onerous for those whose activities it regulates, and must be
made less so.164
The Act is “a flash point of contention between defenders of nature and
advocates of economic progress.”165 These conflicts make the Act a tar-
get, both legislatively and during its implementation.
“ESA-related legislation, passed or proposed, often sparks debates
among landowner organizations, environmental groups, and academi-
cians.”166 A recent report on legislative effort to weaken the Act identi-
fied “at least 303 direct attacks on the Act since 1996, with the majority of
158. Id. § 1531(c)(1).
159. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 171–72 (1978).
160. Id. at 173.
161. Id. at 174.
162. Id. at 194 (“The plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt and
reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost. This is reflected . . . in
literally every section of the statute.”).
163. Id. at 177 (quoting George Cameron Coggins, Conserving Wildlife Resources: An
Overview of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 51 N.D. L. REV. 315, 321 (1975)) (empha-
sis added by the Court).
164. Endangered Species Recovery Act: Hearing on S. 1180 Before the S. Comm. on
Env’t & Pub. Works, 105th Cong. 187 (1998) (statement of Michael J. Bean).
165. Brad Knickerbocker, Controversy Erupts over Endangered Species Act, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (July 25, 2007), https://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0725/p02s01-uspo.html
[http://perma.cc/5BZR-ER7G].
166. Sayeed R. Mehmood & Daowei Zhang, A Roll Call Analysis of the Endangered
Species Act Amendments, 83 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 501, 501 (2001).
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attacks occurring within the past five years. . . . [t]he 114th Congress dra-
matically increased its efforts to take away protections for species, and set
a record-breaking 135 attacks before its departure on December 9,
2016.”167 As of November 2017, in the 115th Congress, “policymakers
have introduced 59 legislative measures that are intended to undermine
the ESA.”168 Not all of the efforts to amend the Act are one sided,169 but
efforts to weaken the Act dominate the last decade of legislative
activity.170
Beyond the legislative agenda, implementation of the Act is particu-
larly controversial when it affects human activities and resources. A study
analyzing funding patterns for recovery spending found that congres-
sional earmarking of funds, litigation patterns, lobbying of congressional
representatives, and institutional patterns all affect agency spending and
“undermine the clear mandate of the ESA and the original intention of
Congress.”171 Political pressures can dramatically alter administration of
ESA mandates.172 FWS Employees report political pressure affecting list-
ing and habitat protection decisions, with a majority of surveyed employ-
ees stating “they knew of cases where Interior Department political
appointees had interfered with scientific reports and decisions.”173
In spite of these pressures, polling suggests continuing and crosscutting
support for the ESA. In one 2015 poll, 90% of registered voters strongly
or somewhat supported the Act, with only 7% opposed to the Act.174 A
2017 poll found 70% of voters opposed removing protections from listed
species, compared to only 22% who support the idea.175 A 2016 poll
found 63% of voters agreed that saving at-risk wildlife from extinction
was a “[v]ery important goal for [the] federal government,” and another
18% agreed that it was a “fairly important goal.”176 This support is long-
167. Politics of Extinction, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://www.biological
diversity.org/campaigns/esa_attacks/table.html [http://perma.cc/6K9L-NZFD] (last updated
Dec. 20, 2017).
168. Jim Lyons, Under Threat: The Endangered Species Act and the Plants and Wildlife
it Protects, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/green/reports/2017/11/28/443265/under-threat/ [http://perma.cc/5QY4-27HQ].
169. Gardner M. Brown & Jason F. Shogren, Economics of the Endangered Species
Act, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4 (1998) (noting the introduction of bills both strengthening and
weakening provisions of the Act).
170. See Politics of Extinction, supra note 167.
171. O’Connell, supra note 148, at 141.
172. Reed D. Benson, So Much Conflict, Yet So Much in Common: Considering the
Similarities Between Western Water Law and the Endangered Species Act, 44 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 29, 30–32 (2004).
173. Knickerbocker, supra note 165.
174. Ben Tulchin et al., Poll Finds Overwhelming, Broad-Based Support for the Endan-
gered Species Act Among Voters Nationwide 1, 2 (2015), https://earthjustice.org/sites/de
fault/files/files/PollingMemoNationalESASurvey.pdf [http://perma.cc/X9R8-TZFK].
175. New Polling Data Underscores Public Support for Endangered Species Protections,
WILDLIFE NEWS (Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.thewildlifenews.com/2017/01/18/new-polling-
data-underscores-public-support-for-endangered-species-protections/ [http://perma.cc/
77DL-5PZW].
176. Hart Research Assocs., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, Public Opinion on Energy, the
Environment, and Climate 7 (2016), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/
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standing; a 1997 poll found “[o]n a scale from 0-100, respondents rated
the importance of conserving species at 76.5, similar to the importance of
property rights (76.3) and economic growth (75.4).”177 These opposing
and tremendous pressures within the debate encourage the Services to
create innovative solutions to endangered species problems and lead to
evolution in species protection.
These four characteristics encourage continued evolutionary develop-
ment of the Act. To summarize, first, the Act itself is a super statute,
largely resistant to change for the last thirty-five years. Second, conserva-
tion science has undergone an unprecedented revolution, but the Act has
not followed suit. Third, courts have also read the Act to allow significant
agency discretion. Fourth, the Act faces intense political pressure from all
sides. If law evolves when faced with selective pressures, but the law can-
not evolve through changes in the text of the Act or through court deci-
sions, this creates a demand for legal evolution that must be met through
administrative evolution of the law. Section III explores the evolution of
the ESA through administrative actions in three case studies.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE EVOLUTION OF THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
The first case study demonstrates administrative evolution of the defi-
nition of a listable species in response to selective pressure from changing
science. The second demonstrates administrative evolution in the treat-
ment of private land in response to selective pressure from an abrupt shift
in the political climate and the need to improve conservation on that
land. The third and final case study demonstrates administrative evolu-
tion of species reintroductions in response to selective pressure from the
local opponents of the reintroductions. Taken together, these three case
studies provide a convincing picture of the administrative evolution of the
ESA.
A. EVOLUTION OF THE SPECIES DEFINITION
Before the ESA can protect a species, the species must first be listed
under the Act.178 Listable species include “subspecies of fish or wildlife
or plants, and any distinct population segment of any species of verte-
brate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when mature.”179 Although tax-
onomists offer definitions of species and subspecies,180 the term “distinct
population segment” (DPS) lacks a counterpart in science; hashing out its
2017/01/18040010/E-12075-CAP-Energy-Enviro-Climate-Voters-FINAL.pdf [http://perma
.cc/54TL-WE32].
177. Brian Czech & Paul R. Krausman, Public Opinion on Species and Endangered
Species Conservation, 14 ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE 7, 9 (1997).
178. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2012).
179. Id. § 1532(16).
180. But see Doremus, supra note 6, at 186–87 (“Subspecies do not have the fundamen-
tal biological significance of species. . . . [T]he subspecies concept is gradually falling out of
favour.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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definition has created a long history of argument and interpretation.181
The breadth of the DPS definition can determine whether a given popula-
tion will be protected at all.182 The DPS term is a cornerstone of the Act’s
attempt to protect genetic diversity within a species, and long-term spe-
cies conservation requires maintenance of this intraspecific diversity.183
This case study tracks the changing scientific understanding of what con-
stitutes a population worthy of protection and charts the evolution of the
administrative definition of a species in light of those changes in the un-
derlying science.
1. Statutory Definition of Species
Congress added the DPS language to the Act in 1978,184 and in 1979
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report criticizing
the species definition as too broad.185 Congress rejected GAO’s call to
change the definition, but the Senate Committee on Environment and
Public Works admonished the Services to use the DPS concept “sparingly
and only when the biological evidence indicates that such action is war-
ranted.”186 The Services repeatedly cite this language as a reason to inter-
pret the definition narrowly.187 This history suggests “Congress intended
to protect at least distinct forms, genetic resources, and domestic popula-
tions,”188 but “[t]he task of defining and listing endangered and
threatened species requires an expertise and attention to detail that ex-
ceeds the normal province of Congress.”189
Scientifically, this initial legislation is significant because it assumed a
static view of nature and a view that evolution did not matter in the short
term, reflecting the dominant scientific paradigms of the era.190 Popula-
181. See Policy Regarding the Recognition of Distinct Vertebrate Population Segments
Under the Endangered Species Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 4,722, 4,722–25 (Feb. 7, 1996) [hereinaf-
ter Joint Policy].
182. Doremus, supra note 6, at 188.
183. David H. Reed & Richard Frankham, Correlation Between Fitness and Genetic
Diversity, 17 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 230, 234 (2003); R. Frankham, Conservation Genet-
ics, 29 ANN. REV. GENETICS 305, 306 (1995).
184. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (2012). The statutory definition of species took its current
form in 1982 when Congress mandated that definitional decisions being made turn “solely
on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available.” Endangered Species Act
Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1411.
185. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CED-79-65, ENDANGERED SPECIES—A
CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE NEEDING RESOLUTION 52 (1979).
186. S. REP. NO. 96-151, at 7 (1979), reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973, at 1397 (1980).
187. Joint Policy, 61 Fed. Reg. 4,722, 4,722 (Feb. 7, 1996). This deference to a suggestion
from a single Senate committee is unwarranted. See William N. Eskridge, Interpreting Leg-
islative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 69–70 (1988).
188. Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better
Science Isn’t Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1095 (1997).
189. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 708
(1995).
190. Doremus, supra note 6, at 202 (noting that “the ESA frames the taxonomy issue in
a static way. That was very much the scientific perspective of the time. Biologists . . . did
not think [evolution] occurred at time scales relevant to human decision-making.”).
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tion genetics was largely nonexistent in the 1970s, and without a broader
population genetics context, taxonomy inevitably focused on morphologi-
cal differences in the here and now, not the historical or future evolution-
ary trajectory of a population.191
2. Early DPS Listings
During the first decade after the DPS amendment, the Services made
little effort to list DPSs and offered little justification when they did so.192
The decisions in that era lacked any explicit discussion of what made
these populations DPSs, and none of the listings even used the term DPS.
This relaxed setting changed in 1989, when the Sierra Club Legal Defense
Fund filed the first DPS-based law suit, a challenge to FWS’s failure to
consider whether the silver rice rat qualified as a DPS.193 In response,
FWS undertook review of the silver rice rat as a distinct population seg-
ment194 and the Services also began rumblings about making a DPS rule,
but failed to do so in the near term.195 The late 1980s also marked an
uptick in conservationists’ focus on populations, a shift from a near-exclu-
sive focus on species or ecosystem level concerns to a focus largely on
protecting population-level diversity.196
In response to the lawsuit and the growing scientific pressure, DPS list-
ings began a steady climb. Although the numbers are a little sketchy, in
1988, petitioners submitted four listings petitions, including one for a
DPS.197 By 1990, this grew to 31 petitions and five for DPS, and by 1992,
thirty-six and ten.198 Petitions increasingly sought both listing of a full
191. See id. at 201; see also Gerald R. Smith & Ralph F. Stearley, The Classification and
Scientific Names of Rainbow and Cutthroat Trouts, 14 FISHERIES 4, 4 (1989) (providing
evidence of this taxonomic approach, coupled with a historical view of the development
molecular ecology approaches to taxonomy).
192. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., FWS & NOAA-Fisheries Species Listed as Distinct
Population Segments (DPS), ENVTL. CONSERVATION ONLINE SYS., https://ecos.fws.gov/
ecp/report/table/species-listed-as-distinct-population-segments.html [http://perma.cc/
ANL2-EMZX] (last visited Nov. 3, 2018) (FWS listing only ten domestic populations of
otherwise unlisted species listed as DPSs by 1989, with only cursory justifications); ENDAN-
GERED SPECIES: A CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE NEEDING RESOLUTION, supra note 185, at 105.
193. Proposed Endangered Status for the Lower Keys Population of the Rice Rat (Sil-
ver Rice Rat), 55 Fed. Reg. 43,002, 43,006 (Oct. 25, 1990).
194. Id. FWS ultimately listed the rat as a DPS due to its isolation and unique silver fur
and long nasal bones. Id.
195. Maine v. Norton, 257 F. Supp. 2d 357, 379 (D. Me. 2003) (noting a public meeting
on DPS definitions); see Proposed Endangered Status for the Lower Keys Population of
the Rice Rat (Silver Rice Rat), Fed. Reg. at 43,004; Definition of Vertebrate Populations,
55 Fed. Reg. 44,592, 44,592 (Oct. 29, 1990) (announcing that a notice of proposed rulemak-
ing would be forthcoming).
196. Robin S. Waples, Distinct Population Segments, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT AT THIRTY: VOLUME 2, CONSERVING BIODIVERSITY IN HUMAN-DOMINATED LAND-
SCAPES 127, 127 (J. Michael Scott et al. eds., 2006).
197. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Endangered Species Act Petitions Received by Fish and
Wildlife Service, ENVTL. CONSERVATION ONLINE SYS., https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp/report/ta
ble/petitions-received.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2019).
198. See id.
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species and, in the alternative, listing of separate DPSs of that species.199
As a result, by 1993 the Services had begun evaluating both whole species
and potential DPSs within that species when addressing any listing
petition.200
In an evolutionary sense, the Services moved from a selective environ-
ment where they evaluated only handful of potential DPSs on relatively
uncontroversial cases to a selective environment where virtually every pe-
tition presented DPS issues and the threat of litigation hung as a constant
presence in the background.201 When faced with increased pressure dur-
ing the 1990s, the Services evolved the DPS law through rulemaking.
They moved from their relaxed early efforts, to a piecemeal approach
where some submissions were considered for a DPS listing, to an ap-
proach where every petitioned species received consideration both as a
full species and as a separate DPS.202
3. Rulemaking to Define a DPS
NMFS’s need for a DPS policy quickly became acute, as the agency
faced several listing petitions for populations of pacific salmon in the
wake of the sharp coast-wide decline in salmon populations beginning in
1990.203 In 1991, NMFS published a “Definition of ‘species’ under the
Endangered Species Act: Application to Pacific Salmon,” (ESU Policy)
which created NMFS’s Evolutionarily Significant Unit (ESU) concept for
use with pacific salmonids.204 This ESU Policy, generally treated as a
rulemaking, marked the next step in an administrative evolution of the
species definition under the Act, in that it defined a DPS as an ESU.205
NMFS’s 1991 policy established two criteria for listing a pacific salmonid
DPS: “(1) It must be substantially reproductively isolated from other
nonspecific population units; and (2) it must represent an important com-
ponent in the evolutionary legacy of the species.”206
199. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 90-Day Finding and
Commencement of Status Review for a Petition to List the Bull Trout, 58 Fed. Reg. 28,849,
28,849 (May 17, 1993) (“T]he petitioners also requested the emergency listing of bull trout
populations in a number of select ‘aquatic ecosystems.’”).
200. See, e.g., id. at 28,852 (“As a part of this review, the Service will evaluate the status
of distinct population segments and determine whether listing is warranted for either the
species rangewide or certain distinct population segments.”).
201. See Proposed Endangered Status for the Lower Keys Population of the Rice Rat
(Silver Rice Rat), 55 Fed. Reg. 43,002, 43,004 (Oct. 25, 1990).
202. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 90-Day Findings and Com-
mencement of Status Review for a Petition to List the Bull Trout, 58 Fed. Reg. at 28,849,
28,852.
203. Donald J. Noakes et al., On the Decline of Pacific Salmon and Speculative Links to
Salmon Farming in British Columbia, 183 AQUACULTURE 363, 363–64 (2000).
204. See generally Policy on Applying the Definition of Species Under the Endangered
Species Act to Pacific Salmon (hereinafter “ESU Policy”), 56 Fed. Reg. 58,612 (Nov. 20,
1991).
205. The policy, authored by Robin Waples, built on a 1981 paper, input from an ESA
technical Committee, and a public workshop. Robin S. Waples, Pacific Salmon,
Oncorhynchus spp., and the Definition of “Species” Under the Endangered Species Act, 53
MARINE FISHERIES REV. 11, 12 (1991).
206. ESU Policy, 56 Fed. Reg. at 58,612.
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NMFS’s definition is remarkable in two ways. First, it focuses almost
entirely on genetics as a driver for population listing,207 setting a pattern
for salmonid listing decisions over the next several years.208 Second, the
1991 rulemaking expressly followed the static view of evolution encapsu-
lated in the Act itself,209 focusing on protection of a species’ “evolution-
ary legacy,” that is, “the genetic variability [from] past evolutionary
events.”210 In short, the “policy presents its purpose in a [ ] static
manner.”211
As might be expected, NMFS’s ESU Policy and their subsequent
rulemakings sparked increased academic interest in the ESA population
question.212 Congress got in on the Act as well, requesting a National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) study of the definition of the term species
under the Act.213 In 1995, the NAS responded with several critiques.214
Reacting to the NAS study, increasing DPS-based petitions and litiga-
tion,215 and the burgeoning scientific literature on listable populations,
the Services finally developed a joint DPS policy (Joint Policy) in 1996.216
The Joint Policy based its DPS definition on two factors: one, the dis-
creteness of the population segment in relation to the remainder of its
207. In response to several comments emphasizing broader values, like “the importance
of preserving biodiversity and the aesthetic, ecological, recreational, and scientific value,”
id. at 58,613 (internal quotation marks omitted), the agency responded that “[a]ttempting
to preserve populations for their aesthetic, scientific, or recreational value without regard
to the underlying genetic basis for diversity focuses on attributes that are not directly re-
lated to long-term survival of the species,” id. at 58,614, and is thus not allowed under its
interpretation of the ESA. Id.
208. See, e.g., Threatened Status for Snake River Spring/Summer Chinook Salmon,
Threatened Status for Snake River Fall Chinook Salmon, 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653, 14,654 (Apr.
22, 1992) (relying heavily on absence of genetic information to combine the spring and
summer runs of Chinook salmon into one DPS, and similarly using genetic data to justify
listing the fall run fish as a separate DPS); Mid-Columbia River Summer Chinook Salmon,
59 Fed. Reg. 48,855, 48,858–59 (Sept. 23, 1994) (determining that a lack of evidence of
genetic isolation precluded listing of the mid-Columbia River summer Chinook as a DPS).
209. NMFS rejected protection for newly isolated populations, arguing that “consider-
ing recently isolated stocks to be ESUs simply on the basis of their isolation is not appro-
priate,” but a comprehensive view of evolution, one that does not take a static view of the
process would require protection of these populations. ESU Policy, 56 Fed. Reg. at 58,616.
210. Id.
211. Doremus, supra note 6, at 199.
212. See, e.g., Craig Moritz, Defining ‘Evolutionarily Significant Units’ for Conservation,
9 TRENDS ECOL. EVOL. 373, 373 (1994); Kevin D. Hill, The Endangered Species Act: What
Do We Mean by Species?, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 239, 239–40 (1993); David S.
Wilcove et al., What Exactly Is an Endangered Species? An Analysis of the U.S. Endangered
Species List: 1985–1991, 7 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 87, 88 (1993).
213. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 3
(1995).
214. Id. at 3–4.
215. See, e.g., Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, 926 F. Supp. 920, 926 (D.
Ariz. 1996) (noting that there was “no clear and consistent [DPS] policy to which this
Court could defer,” and invalidating a FWS decision to deny listing to a population of
northern goshawk based on FWS’s determination that the population did not constitute a
DPS); U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 197. Prosecution of the case would have put
the Services on notice of the need for a final DPS policy.
216. Joint Policy, 61 Fed. Reg. 4,722, 4,722 (Feb. 7, 1996). The draft policy came out in
December 1994. Id.
110 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
species; and two, the significance of the population segment to its spe-
cies.217 The policy largely tracked the ESU Policy for pacific salmonids,218
although the Joint Policy placed much less emphasis on genetic isola-
tion,219 instead explicitly recognizing a larger role for “physical, physio-
logical, ecological, or behavioral factors.”220 This approach also leaves a
little more room for a non-static view of nature, although the policy does
not provide explicit guidance for newly isolated populations. The Joint
Policy marked the next evolutionary step for the Services, as it was clearly
iterative and constrained by the prior ESU Policy.221 The Joint Policy re-
flects the selective pressures of the increased congressional oversight and
negative feedback from the NAS study.
Although the continued application of the ESU Policy and the applica-
tion of the new Joint Policy produced significant debate among commen-
tators,222 little of this criticism moved beyond the academic literature.
The Services’ ESU and Joint Policy faced only light selective pressure
until a series of court cases beginning in 2001.223 Many of these cases
focused on the application of the ESU concept to pacific salmonids, and
administrative infighting combined with this series of judicial decisions to
create strong selective pressures on NMFS, resulting in a rapid evolution
of their approach to listing steelhead DPSs.
4. Steelhead/Rainbow Trout DPS Controversy
Steelhead are the ocean-going form of rainbow trout, Onchorhynchus
mykiss. Like salmon, steelhead are born in fresh water and eventually
migrate out to the ocean to mature.224 After a variable number of years,
mature steelhead migrate upstream to their natal streams to breed.225
217. Id.
218. ESU Policy, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,612, 58,612 (Nov. 20, 1991).
219. Compare the discreteness factor in the Joint Policy with the substantial reproduc-
tive isolation factors of NMFS’s ESU Policy, and the significance factor in the Joint Policy
with important component in the evolutionary legacy factor of NMFS’s ESU Policy.
220. Joint Policy, 61 Fed. Reg. at 4,725.
221. The Services noted that “NMFS policy for salmonids is consistent with the [Joint
Policy], although the salmonid policy is formulated specifically to address the biology of
this group,” id. at 4,723, and called the ESU Policy “a detailed extension of this joint pol-
icy.” Id. at 4,722.
222. Consider, for example, the long running peer reviewed conversation between
NMFS scientist Robin Waples and two other prominent conservation biologists. See Tanya
A. Gulesserian, The Departments of Commerce and Interior: Bifurcating an Evolutionary
Significant Unit Under the Endangered Species Act, 23 VT. L. REV. 605, 633–34 (1999)
(collecting citations).
223. See, e.g., Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, 559 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 2009); Nw. Ecosys.
All. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136, 1143–45 (9th Cir. 2007); Nat’l Ass’n of
Homebuilders v. Norton, 340 F.3d 835, 838 (9th Cir. 2003); Defenders of Wildlife v. Nor-
ton, 258 F.3d 1136, 1144–45 (9th Cir. 2001); Alsea Valley All. v. Evans, 161 F. Supp. 2d
1154, 1163 (D. Or. 2001); see also Katherine M. Hausrath, Note, The Designation of “Dis-
tinct Population Segments” Under the Endangered Species Act in Light of National Associa-
tion of Homebuilders v. Norton, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 449, 452–54 (2005).
224. THOMAS P. QUINN, THE BEHAVIOR AND ECOLOGY OF PACIFIC SALMON AND
TROUT 68 (Univ. of Washington Press, 2005).
225. Id. at 69.
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Two aspects of steelhead make them a particularly strong candidate for
observing administratively-driven legal evolution. First, due to their prev-
alence around water infrastructure on the west coast, NMFS faces serious
political and legal pressure concerning listing and management of the
steelhead.226 Second, the science around steelhead has been particularly
active.227 Perhaps the most significant scientific development regarding
steelhead listings has been the elucidation of the steelhead’s relationship
to resident rainbow trout. Historically, commentators believed that steel-
head and trout in the same stream did not interbreed.228 By 1996, NMFS
began to realize that some interbreeding or crossover between the popu-
lations might occur.229 Given the way that the ESU Policy defined listable
populations (i.e. emphasis on substantial reproductive isolation demon-
strated by a lack of gene flow with another population),230 this new
knowledge, coupled with the high stakes of water politics on the west
coast, was bound to spark rapid evolution in the law.
Prior to 2001, NMFS followed its established ESU Policy for listing the
steelhead.231 In response to several steelhead listing petitions in the mid-
1990s, NMFS sought to delineate fifteen steelhead ESUs.232 In 1996,
NMFS found that genetic information required it to define ESUs that
included steelhead and rainbow trout.233 But FWS, which has jurisdiction
over freshwater fish, stymied NMFS’s efforts to include resident rainbow
trout in the steelhead listing.234 FWS determined that “only the anadro-
mous forms of O. mykiss should be included in the listed steelhead ESUs
at this time.”235 In response, NMFS determined the resident trout were
still part of the ESU, but listed only the anadromous portion of the ESU,
in effect parsing the ESU into two parts for listing purposes.236 A few
226. See, e.g., PETER B. MOYLE ET AL., STATE OF THE SALMONIDS (2017) (identifying
dams as the single biggest threat to steelhead existence in California).
227. See, e.g., EGGY J. BUSBY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMER., NOAA TECH. MEMO.,
NMFS-NWFSC-27, STATUS REVIEW OF WEST COAST STEELHEAD FROM WASHINGTON,
IDAHO, OREGON, AND CALIFORNIA (1996).
228. See, e.g., Ferris Neave, Racial Characteristics and Migratory Habits in Salmo
Gairdneri, 6 J. FISHERIES RES. BOARD CAN. 245, 251 (1944); see also Christian E. Zimmer-
man & Gordon H. Reeves, Population Structure of Sympatric Anadromous and
Nonanadromous Oncorhynchus Mykiss: Evidence from Spawning Surveys and Otolith
Microchemistry, 57 CAN. J. FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCI. 2152, 2153 (2000) (“The relation-
ship of migratory and resident forms of rainbow trout has long confused biologists.”).
229. BUSBY ET AL., supra note 227, at 11, 58.
230. ESU Policy, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,612, 58,612 (Nov. 20, 1991).
231. Gulesserian, supra note 222, at 606–07 (criticizing as unlawful NMFS’s decision to
list steelhead separately from rainbow trout).
232. BUSBY ET AL., supra note 227, at 55; Endangered and Threatened Species: Listing
of Several Evolutionary Significant Units (ESUs) of West Coast Steelhead, 62 Fed. Reg.
43,937, 43,941 (Aug. 18, 1997).
233. Proposed Endangered Status for Five ESUs of Steelhead and Proposed
Threatened Status for Five ESUs of Steelhead in Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Califor-
nia, 61 Fed. Reg. 41,541, 41,543 (Aug. 9, 1996).
234. Letter from Michael J. Spear, Reg’l Dir. of the Fish and Wildlife Serv., to William
W. Stelle, Jr., Northwest Reg’l Adm’r for the Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. 2 (July 29, 1997).
235. Id. at 3.
236. Endangered and Threatened Species: Listing of Several Evolutionary Significant
Units (ESUs) of West Coast Steelhead, 62 Fed. Reg. at 43,941.
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years later, in the 2001 Alsea Valley Alliance v. Evans decision,237 a dis-
trict court found that any division for listing purposes below the DPS
(and hence ESU) level was “not allowed under the ESA,”238 creating
serious problems for NMFS’s steelhead listing practices. NMFS agreed to
undertake a comprehensive reevaluation of its west coast salmonid list-
ings, including “(1) a public rulemaking process to formulate ESA listing
standards for salmon ESUs . . . [and] (2) application of these standards to
all relevant salmon and steelhead ESUs.”239
This legal pressure dovetailed with a transition in the science of evolu-
tion and molecular ecology that also applied selective pressure to the
ESU approach. As discussed above, prior to the early 2000s, a static view
of species and evolution dominated both the scientific community and the
legal world. During the formation of the DPS policies, many scientists
“thought of evolution as an historical process. . . . [A]lthough they knew
that evolution was never over, they did not think it occurred at time
scales relevant to human decision-making.”240 Most ecologists took the
view that contemporary evolution was rare.241 This view became increas-
ingly untenable in the early 2000s, as study after study documented rapid
evolutionary changes in populations, often coming within only a few gen-
erations.242 Notably, NMFS scientists were involved in some of the re-
search documenting contemporary evolution in pacific salmonids, so
NMFS believes available evidence suggests that resident rainbow trout
should be included in listed steelhead ESUs in certain cases. Such cases in-
clude: (1) Where resident O. mykiss have the opportunity to interbreed with
anadromous fish below natural or man-made barriers; or (2) where resident
fish of native lineage once had the ability to interbreed with anadromous fish
but no longer do because they are currently above human-made barriers, and
they are considered essential for recovery of the ESU.
Id. “[T]he FWS, which has ESA authority for resident fish, maintains that behavioral forms
can be regarded as separate DPSs . . . and that absent evidence suggesting resident rainbow
trout need ESA protection, the FWS concludes that only the anadromous forms of each
ESU should be listed under the ESA.” Id. “At this time, NMFS is listing only anadromous
life forms of O. mykiss.” Id. at 43,951.
237. Alsea Valley All. v. Evans, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1163 (D. Or. 2001).
238. Id. at 1162.
239. Alsea Valley All. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 358 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004).
240. Doremus, supra note 6, at 202.
241. Craig A. Stockwell et al., Contemporary Evolution Meets Conservation Biology, 18
TRENDS ECOL. EVOL. 94, 94 (2003).
242. See id.; Philipp W. Messer et al., Can Population Genetics Adapt to Rapid Evolu-
tion?, 32 TRENDS GENETICS 408, 408 (2016); Robin S. Waples et al., Evolutionary Re-
sponses by Native Species to Major Anthropogenic Changes to Their Ecosystems: Pacific
Salmon in the Columbia River Hydropower System, 17 MOLECULAR ECOLOGY 84, 84
(2008). These three review articles document numerous studies in the early 2000s that
found rapid evolution on the time scale of a decade or two. See, e.g., Peter R. Grant & B.
Rosemary Grant, Unpredictable Evolution in a 30-Year Study of Darwin’s Finches, 296
SCIENCE 707, 707 (2002) (rapid evolution of beak shape and body size over a thirty-year
period in Darwin’s finches on the Gala´pagos islands); Hitoshi Araki et al., Genetic Effects
of Captive Breading Causes a Rapid, Cumulative Fitness Decline in the Wild, 318 SCIENCE
100, 100–02 (2007). Genetic effects of captive breeding cause a rapid, cumulative fitness
decline in the wild. Id. (even one generation of hatchery breeding in salmon led to striking
genetic changes and decreased fitness).
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NMFS was certainly aware of the evolving scientific understanding.243
NMFS sought new guidance on the issue by asking an independent panel
of experts headed by Jody Hey (Hey Panel) whether the ESU Policy ac-
counted for contemporary evolution and what NMFS should do with the
trout/steelhead question.244 The Hey Panel recommended that NMFS
shift away from its prior focus on evolutionary legacy when determining
whether a population could be listed under the Act and that trout and
steelhead be listed together as an ESU.245 The panel suggested that
NMFS focus on “ecological exchangeability [i.e. the ecological context
faced by the population] and the short term evolutionary forces.”246 For
an agency required to make decisions based on the best available science,
this change was important. NMFS could not continue to ignore contem-
porary evolution in its determinations of which populations constituted a
listable species under the ESA.247
In January 2006, NMFS completed its comprehensive status review and
listed ten DPSs of steelhead.248 The listing process was protracted.249
NMFS again initially proposed listing resident trout as part of steelhead
ESUs in some cases, but FWS again rebuffed their effort.250 Ultimately,
NMFS departed from its longstanding use of the ESU Policy in evaluating
the proposed steelhead populations. Instead, it applied the Services’
broader Joint Policy, which allowed NMFS to list populations of steel-
head while excluding the resident fish. While tacitly acknowledging the
bureaucratic background, NMFS maintained that the marked separation
between the anadromous and resident life-history forms “[based on]
physical, physiological, ecological, and behavioral factors”251 made them
discrete, in keeping with the requirements of the Joint Policy. This listing
decision was challenged in both federal district court252 and the Ninth
Circuit,253 and both courts explicitly upheld NMFS’s decision to change
243. See e.g., Waples et al., supra note 242. Dr. Waples was the lead author of NMFS’s
ESU Policy.
244. JODY HEY ET AL., CONSIDERING LIFE HISTORY, BEHAVIORAL, & ECOLOGICAL
COMPLEXITY IN DEFINING CONSERVATION UNITS FOR PACIFIC SALMON: AN INDEPENDENT
PANEL REPORT, REQUESTED BY NOAA FISHERIES 1 (2005), https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/237209612_Considering_Life_History_Behavioral_and_Ecological_Complexity
_in_Defining_Conservation_Units_for_Pacific_Salmon [http://perma.cc/BN6Y-2BEL].
245. Id. at 7.
246. Id.
247. Doremus, supra note 6, at 223 (“The ESU and DPS Policies . . . turn the Services’
attention too much to the evolutionary past and too little to the evolutionary future.”).
248. Endangered and Threatened Species: Final Listing Determinations for 10 Distinct
Population Segments of West Coast Steelhead, 71 Fed. Reg. 834, 834 (Jan. 5, 2006) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 223, 224).
249. Id. at 835 (NMFS extended comments twice, closed comments, and then reopened
comments, seeking additional comments on its proposed fix to the administrative impasse).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Grange v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1112 (E.D. Cal.
2008).
253. Modesto v. Gutierrez, 619 F.3d 1024, 1026 (9th Cir. 2010).
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its listing criteria.254 The Ninth Circuit concluded that
[i]n light of the evolving understanding of the differences between
the fish, the desire for a flexible policy, and the depth of considera-
tion that NMFS has given the issue over close to two decades, we
conclude that the agency was not arbitrary or capricious in changing
its policy in order to protect the steelhead.255
The ruling appears to have ended the resident/steelhead dispute, at least
for the time being.256
5. Evidence for Legal Evolution from Species Definitions
The development of the species definition, from the early years,
through the ESU and the Joint Policy, to the final reversal on treatment
of steelhead populations, follows a notably evolutionary trajectory. From
an evolutionary perspective, the early years were a period of relaxed se-
lection, that is, a period when sources of selection on a particular trait are
weakened or eliminated.257 In biological systems, traits facing weak or no
selective pressure exhibit wide variation.258 When the Services faced little
selective pressure on their DPS-related decisions,259 their DPS approach
varied widely from case to case. This gave the Services significant flexibil-
ity to try myriad approaches at little or no cost to the agency, and the
early listings show significant evidence of this kind of variation—the Ser-
vices-based DPS designations on separation of breeding areas,260 use of
populations in prominent studies,261 geographic isolation,262 and adminis-
trative convenience.263 This period of relaxed selection ended with the
silver rat lawsuit and the burgeoning interest in populations as units of
254. See e.g., Waples et al., supra note 242; see also ESU Policy, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,612,
58,612 (Nov. 20, 1991).
255. Modesto, 619 F.3d at 1037.
256. While this appears to have resolved the immediate anadromous/resident issue for
NMFS, it invites reevaluation of the Services’ current classification of other steelhead
populations, not evaluated in the rulemaking, which is based entirely on the abandoned
ESU Policy.
257. David C. Lahti et al., Relaxed Selection in the Wild, 24 TRENDS ECOL. EVOL. 487,
487 (2009).
258. Id.
259. Until the silver rat case, research uncovers no challenges to a DPS delineation.
260. E.g., Interior Population of Least Tern to be Endangered, 50 Fed. Reg. 21,784,
21,784 (May 28, 1985) (to be codified 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
261. Listing as Threatened With Critical Habitat for the Beaver Dam Slope Population
of the Desert Tortoise in Utah, 45 Fed. Reg. 55,654, 55,660, 55,662 (Aug. 20, 1980) (codified
at 50 C.F.R. §17.11 (2018)) (relying on the population’s “historical preeminence in turtle
ecological studies”).
262. See, e.g., Determination of Endangered Status for Population of Woodland Cari-
bou Found in Washington, Idaho, & Southern British Columbia, 48 Fed. Reg. 49,245,
49,245 (Oct. 25, 1983) (codified at 50 C.F.R. §17.11).
263. See Determination of Endangered and Threatened Status for Piping Plover, 50
Fed. Reg. 50,726, 50,730 (Feb. 11, 1985) (codified at 50 C.F.R. §17.11) (“The Service’s
breakdown of the plover’s breeding range into the Atlantic coast breeding range, Great
Lakes region, and northern Great Plains is not intended to convey the occurrence of sub-
species or totally separate genetic populations, but rather to take note of the discontinuous
distribution of the species.”).
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conservation, and in response the Services moved to a unitary approach,
analyzing every submission for potential listing as a DPS (or, in NMFS’
case, an ESU). This is variation and then selection down to a small subset
of approaches.
The Services made do with the two listing approaches for half a decade,
until the selective environment tightened once again, and new science,
coupled with the Alsea decision, forced NMFS to change its approach.
NMFS considered a range of possibilities, gathered through rulemaking
and suggestions from FWS, before selecting the DPS approach to listing
steelhead as reflected by the final listing determination. This final listing
determination is a strange outcome that clearly results from the con-
straints of NMFS’s prior listing policies and the overall constraints of the
ESA itself. It is strange in several ways—particularly because it does not
reflect the state of the science on resident and anadromous steelhead
populations.264 It fails to reflect the reasoned responses from the Hey
Panel, which was supposed to guide the relisting effort.265 And it belies
the Services’ longstanding position that the ESU was a specialized appli-
cation of the DPS policy.266
NMFS’s listing policy faced serious selective pressures, from both the
science (which mandated that resident fish be listed with steelhead), and
from litigation and the broader public (which demanded protection for
the steelhead portions of the rainbow trout populations, which might be
impossible if resident fish were listed with steelhead).267 NMFS was con-
strained in the approaches it could take by its past policies (the ESU Pol-
icy and the Services Joint Policy) and by FWS’s inherent power to limit
NMFS’s steelhead listing efforts. In a word, this is inheritance. Ulti-
mately, NMFS tried twice to follow the science and list steelhead and
resident rainbow trout in the same ESU, only to have FWS stymie both
efforts, and NMFS was forced into a convoluted and perhaps illegal way
to separate out the resident fish. This inelegant solution, not an ideal so-
lution from a policy or science perspective, is exactly the kind of local
optimum that serves as significant evidence of evolution.268 Better solu-
tions exist, but, like the ladybug, NMFS couldn’t get there from where it
began.
264. For newer data, see C.E. Zimmerman et al., Maternal Origin & Migratory History
of Steelhead & Rainbow Trout Captured in Rivers of the Central Valley, California, 138
TRANSACTIONS AM. FISHERIES SOC. 280 (2009); see also D.A. Weigel et al., Fluvial Rain-
bow Trout Contribute to the Colonization of Steelhead (Oncorhynchus Mykiss) in a Small
Stream, 97 ENVIRONMENTAL BIOLOGY OF FISHES 1149 (2013); I.I. Courter et al., Resident
Rainbow Trout Produce Anadromous Offspring in a Large Interior Watershed, 70 CANA-
DIAN J. FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCIS. 701 (2013).
265. HEY ET AL., supra note 244, at 7.
266. If it were, surely application of the DPS policy would have resulted in the same
outcome for steelhead and resident fish as the ESU Policy had.
267. UC Davis Center for Watershed Resources, Are Central Valley Steelhead Really
Threatened?, CALIFORNIA WATERBLOG (Dec. 8, 2013), https://californiawaterblog.com/
2013/12/08/are-central-valley-steelhead-really-threatened/ [http:// perma.cc/KVJ2-UU62].
268. See Schwartz, supra note 123, at 292–93.
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Although the application of the ESU/Joint Policy to steelhead popula-
tions appears settled for now, the broader DPS policy appears likely to
face continued evolutionary pressures. In the steelhead rulemaking,
NMFS noted that “NMFS and FWS also intend to continue to evaluate
application of the statutory term ‘distinct population segment’ in a pro-
cess outside the context of a species-specific listing.”269 The policy contin-
ues to face court challenges,270 critical commentary,271 and continued
pressure from the scientific community both as criticism of existing prac-
tices272 and continued development of molecular genetics and evolu-
tion.273 The evolution of species law will continue.
B. EVOLUTION OF THE SAFE HARBOR PROGRAM WITHOUT
A STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The next evolutionary case study focuses on the development of the
ESA Safe Harbor program. Essentially, this program encourages private
landowners to improve habitat for endangered species on their land by
granting them immunity from the ESA’s take prohibitions for listed spe-
cies that utilize the improved habitat. This popular program evolved due
to two selective forces: a recognition that successful conservation of many
listed species would require habitat on private land, and the significant
political pressure on the Act that grew out of the property rights
movement.
1. Political and Scientific Pressure
In the early 1990s, tensions were running high between landowners and
FWS in the Sandhills region of North Carolina.274 The area hosted a large
population of the endangered red-cockaded woodpeckers (RCWs) essen-
tial for the recovery of the species as a whole. But roughly 30% of
Sandhills RCWs lived on private land, and the private land flocks had
declined significantly since the 1980s.275 Although the ESA protects occu-
269. Endangered and Threatened Species: Final Listing Determinations for 10 Distinct
Population Segments of West Coast Steelhead, 71 Fed. Reg. 834, 834 (Jan. 5, 2006) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 223 & 224).
270. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Homebuilders v. Norton, 340 F.3d 835, 838 (9th Cir. 2003).
271. See, e.g., Derek O. Teaney, The Insignificant Killer Whale: A Case Study of Inher-
ent Flaws in the Wildlife Services’ Distinct Population Segment Policy and a Proposed Solu-
tion, 34 ENVTL. L. 647 (2004).
272. See, e.g., Robin S. Waples, & Oscar Gaggiotti, What is a Population? An Empirical
Evaluation of Some Genetic Methods for Identifying Gene Pools & Their Degree of Con-
nectivity, 15 MOLECULAR ECOLOGY 1419, 1419 (2006); see also Tatjana Rosen, The Endan-
gered Species Act & the Distinct Population Segment Policy, 18 URSUS 109, 109 (2007).
273. See, e.g., Jon E. Hess, et al., Genetic Basis of Adult Migration Timing in Anadro-
mous Steelhead Discovered Through Multivariate Association Testing, 283 PROC. R. SOC. B.
1, 1 (2016) (discussing the apparent genetic determination of run timing in steelhead, and
thus implicitly suggesting that steelhead runs may be separately listable under the ESA).
274. Ted Toombs, Safe Harbor: Helping Landowners Help Endangered Species, 27
RANGELANDS ARCHIVES 35, 35 (2005).
275. Availability of an Environmental Assessment and an Application for an Incidental
Take Permit to Implement the Red-cockaded Woodpecker “Safe Harbor” Program in the
Sandhills Region of North Carolina, 60 Fed. Reg. 10,400, 10,400-01 (Feb. 24, 1995).
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pied habitat and individual RCWs on private land, it does not provide
any affirmative private mandate for conservation, and so FWS had to
convince local landowners to voluntarily improve the woodpecker habitat
on their land. This was not inherently at odds with the landowners’ man-
agement objectives,276 but the landowners intensely feared increased reg-
ulation and loss of control if the RCWs took up residence on their lands.
Landowners were preemptively cutting their forests to keep RCWs away.
One local landowner had a license plate reading “I EAT RCWS.”277 It
was an uphill battle for FWS.
This microcosm fairly represented the national scene for the ESA in
the mid-1990s. The ESA earned its stripes in the nineties.278 First, in 1990,
the listing of the northern spotted owl reduced the harvest of old growth
forest by more than 80%.279 This listing sparked lawsuits, lobbying,280
and fierce protests by both environmentalists and the timber industry.281
Protestors nailed dead owls to road signs282 and President Bush even con-
vened the “God Squad,” a rarely used cabinet-level ESA committee that
could permit the extinction of a species due to federal actions under some
circumstances.283 The Clinton Administration finally developed a logging
plan that allowed some limited logging to proceed, but the plan did little
to reassure timber and private property rights advocates.284
Next, in 1993 and again in 1994, the ESA came up for reauthorization.
The democratically-controlled House and Senate could not agree on a
reauthorization plan and instead funded the Act on a one-year basis.285
276. Toombs, supra note 274, at 35.
277. Id.
278. See, e.g., John Leshy, The Babbitt Legacy at the Department of Interior: A Prelimi-
nary View, 31 ENVTL. L. 199, 213 (2001) (“When Babbitt took office, the ESA’s bite was
spreading across the nation to the Pacific Northwest, to Texas, to southern California, to
the pine forests of the South, and elsewhere, and its congressional support was steadily
eroding.”).
279. John H. Cushman Jr., Judge Approves Plan for Logging In Forests Where Rare
Owls Live, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1994, at A1 (noting approval of a plan that allow timber
companies to take “less than one-fifth of the harvest during the 1980’s”); see also Seattle
Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1088 (W.D. Wash. 1991) aff’d sub nom. Seattle
Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
280. See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 771 F. Supp. at 1084.
281. Don’t Blame the Owl, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1992, at A16.
282. See Les Blumenthal, After 20 Years of Protection, Owl Declining But Forests Re-
main, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (Sept. 5, 2010), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/
nation-world/national/article24592138.html [http://perma.cc/4VF7-ZZ9P]; see also Note
Hinting At Fire Threat Found With Dead Spotted Owl, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 16 1991), http:/
/community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19910116&slug=1260870 [http://per
ma.cc/NA9N-EHX2].
283. Timothy Egan, Politics Reign at Spotted Owl Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1992, at
A14. The God Squad ultimately approved only thirteen of forty-four proposed national
forest timber sales (roughly 2,000 acres) and suffered accusations of ex parte contacts with
the White House. See Michael A. Bosh, The “God Squad” Proves Mortal: Ex Parte Con-
tacts and the White House After Portland Audubon Society, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1029,
1029–30 (1994).
284. Cushman, supra note 279, at A1.
285. Nancy K. Kubasek et al., It Takes an Entire Village to Protect an Endangered Spe-
cies: Individualism, Overlapping Spheres, and the Endangered Species Act, 10 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L.J. 155, 194 (1999).
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In November 1994, the Republican Revolution swept elections nation-
wide, riding a wave of anti-government sentiment.286 Newt Gingrich lead
the charge with his Contract with America, which included a very strong
anti-regulatory bent. Just a few months after taking office, congressional
Republicans launched an effort to reign in the ESA,287 ultimately settling
for a one-year listing moratorium.288 The congressional effort to amend
the Act eventually failed, and the stalemate on the ESA continued, albeit
with intensified rhetoric. The ESA remains without a long-term
reauthorization.
Then a 1995 Supreme Court decision further fanned the flames. Al-
though the ESA always protected individual listed animals on private
land, the Services expanded the reach of the ESA in the 1970s to protect
habitat on private land.289 In the early 1990s, the property rights move-
ment gained steam and launched a litigation campaign to strike down the
regulation.290 The Supreme Court ultimately ruled 6-3 against them291
and the decision stoked the fires of the anti-ESA movement. The dissent
argued that the ESA “imposes unfairness to the point of financial ruin—
not just upon the rich, but upon the simplest farmer who finds his land
conscripted to national zoological use,”292 and “industry groups vowed to
carry the anti-regulatory fight to Congress.”293
Even as ESA politics grew rockier, conservationists were beginning to
clamor for more help for species on private lands.294 Conservation scien-
tists found that private lands played a pivotal role in supporting endan-
gered species conservation and would often be required for endangered
species recovery.295 A 1994 GAO study found that more than 90% of
listed species occurred on private lands, and two-thirds required private
land for most of their habitat.296 As a New York Times article in 1995
noted, “protecting wildlife without regulating use of private land has been
compared by biologists to playing the piano with just the black keys.”297
286. John H. Cushion, Congressional Republicans Take Aim at an Extensive List of En-
vironmental Statutes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1995, at A14.
287. Id.
288. Kubasek et al., supra note 285, at 194.
289. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Redefinition of “Harm”, 40
Fed. Reg. 44,412, 44,416 (Sept. 26, 1975) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2018)) (to emphasize
that, for the habitat modification to be a take, it must result for actual death or injury of a
protected animal).
290. John H. Cushman Jr., The Supreme Court: Endangered Species; Environmentalists
Win a Victory, but Action by Congress May Interrupt the Celebration, N.Y. TIMES, June 30,
1995, at A24.
291. Babbitt v. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687, 697 (1995).
292. Id.
293. Cushman, supra note 290, at A24.
294. DAVID S. WILCOVE ET AL., REBUILDING THE ARK: TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT FOR PRIVATE LAND (1996).
295. See, e.g., M.J. Bean & David S. Wilcove, Ending the Impasse, 13 ENVTL. FORUM
22, 22–28 (1996); Robert Meltz, Where the Wild Things Are: The Endangered Species Act
and Private Property, 24 ENVTL. L. 369, 370 (1994).
296. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/RCED-95-16, ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT: INFORMATION ON SPECIES PROTECTION ON NONFEDERAL LANDS 4–5 (1994).
297. Cushman, supra note 290, at A24.
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These studies made it clear that endangered species recovery would re-
quire more from private landowners, but the Act offered only prohibi-
tions on private actions, not inducements or proactive requirements.
Conservationists needed new tools to get the cooperation they wanted
from private landowners. The Act offered no such tools.
2. Safe Harbor Inception
In 1995, the FWS Southeast Regional Office, in conjunction with the
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and other organizations and state
foresters,298 initiated a new program, the Safe Harbor Program, designed
to address some of these concerns within the existing ESA framework.299
The Program, created by EDF and an ad hoc working group with repre-
sentatives from FWS’ Raleigh and Asheville Field Offices, Fort Bragg,
North Carolina Wildlife Resources Commission, North Carolina Natural
Heritage Program, North Carolina State University, and the Sandhills
Area Land Trust,300 began as a modified Habitat Conservation Plan
(HCP), a statutory FWS program designed to mitigate take of a listed
species.
The Regional Office launched the Safe Harbor Program to address the
RCW in the Sandhills of North Carolina, and within ten years the pro-
gram “enrolled a total of nearly 45,000 acres in Safe Harbor agreements
with the local [FWS] office. [Eighty landowners] pledged to protect
habitat for any woodpeckers that may already be on their property and to
restore or enhance habitat that additional woodpeckers may use.”301 This
first Safe Harbor program was “designed to encourage voluntary RCW
habitat restoration or enhancement activities by relieving a landowner
who enters into a cooperative agreement with the Service from any addi-
tional responsibility under the Act beyond that which exists at the time
he or she enters into the agreement.”302 FWS agreed not to pursue take
allegations for any taking of RWC that moved into the improved
habitat.303
The program worked. “No sooner had Safe Harbor been implemented
than preemptive clear-cutting [of potential RCW habitat] ceased. Land-
owners couldn’t enroll fast enough.”304 The program answered several
298. See Robert Bonnie, Safe Harbor for the Red-Cockaded Woodpecker, J. FORESTRY,
Apr. 1997, at 20.
299. Availability of an Environmental Assessment and an Application for an Incidental
Take Permit to Implement the Red-cockaded Woodpecker “Safe Harbor” Program in the
Sandhills Region of North Carolina, 60 Fed. Reg. 10,400, 10,400–01 (Feb. 24, 1995).
300. S.L. MILLER ET AL., NORTH CAROLINA SANDHILLS RED-COCKADED WOOD-
PECKER SAFE HARBOR PROGRAM: CURRENT STATUS & LESSONS LEARNED 4 (2004).
301. Toombs, supra note 274, at 35.
302. Availability of an Environmental Assessment and an Application for an Incidental
Take Permit to Implement the Red-cockaded Woodpecker “Safe Harbor” Program in the
Sandhills Region of North Carolina, 60 Fed. Reg. at 10,400–01.
303. Id.
304. Ted Williams, Recovery: Saving a Woodpecker Through Research & Ingenuity,
COOL GREEN SCIENCE (Apr. 3, 2018), https://blog.nature.org/science/2018/04/03/recovery-
saving-a-woodpecker-through-research-ingenuity/ [http://perma.cc/8QL8-5MK3].
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needs, increasing private landowner participation in conservation and at
the same time respecting the private property interests that were driving
much of the congressional disgruntlement with the Act.
As soon as the Southeast Regional Office launched its Safe Harbor
Program, the program began replicating throughout FWS. FWS com-
pleted a second agreement in 1995 and a third in 1996, both through its
Southwest Regional Office.305 By 1997, the national FWS office began
the process of making Safe Harbor Agreements official FWS policy.306
After promulgation of the final safe harbor rules in 1999,307 the Safe Har-
bor Program exploded in popularity. As of April 2018, one hundred Safe
Harbor Programs have been approved, most including a large number of
landowners, all together covering well north of 100 million acres.308
3. Evidence for Legal Evolution from the Safe Harbor Program
This program marks a clear administrative evolution of the ESA. De-
spite widespread agreement that portions of the Act needed revision in
the early 1990s, Congress was gridlocked.309 Prior political pressure over
private property concerns had produced significant revisions to the Act in
the past, including the creation of the incidental take permits in 1982,310
but the partisan (and intra-party) splits in Congress made such action im-
possible in the 1990s. Facing a hostile Congress and a growing property
rights movement, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt pushed FWS to
change the way it administered the ESA in order to coopt the legislative
efforts to amend the Act.311 Secretary Babbitt “perceived that a major
reason the Act was foundering was that it was not being administered
with an eye toward success-when success was measured not only by effec-
tiveness in protecting species, but also by common sense principles of ad-
305. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Conservation Plans by Type and U.S. FWS Region,
ENVTL. CONSERVATION ONLINE SYS., https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp0/conservationPlan/ [http://
perma.cc/669X-3FRY ] (last visited July 22, 2018).
306. Announcement of Draft Safe Harbor Policy, 62 Fed. Reg. 32,178, 32,178-01 (June
12, 1997).
307. Safe Harbor Agreements and Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assur-
ances, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,706, 32,706-01 (June 17, 1999).
308. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 305.
309. Leshy, supra note 278, at 213 (“Although matters needed fixing, Congress was
sorely divided, hopelessly divided as it turned out, on what should be done.”).
310. Darcy H. Kishida, Safe Harbor Agreements Under the Endangered Species Act: Are
They Right for Hawai’i, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 507, 508 (2000) (“In an attempt to assuage
disgruntled landowners, Congress amended the ESA in 1982 to be more flexible. Land-
owners can now obtain a conditional ‘incidental take permit,’ which allows the holder to
‘take’ endangered species subject to certain mitigation requirements.”); Srinath Jay
Govindan, Taking Steps to Protect Private Property and Endangered Species: Constitutional
Implications of Habitat Conservation Planning After Dolan v. Tigard, 47 EMORY L.J. 311,
311 (1998) (“Congress soon realized that the ESA in its original form impinged too greatly
upon the rights of individual landowners. . . . As a result, the ESA was amended in 1982 to
provide an opportunity for landowners to reduce the harsh result of the law.”).
311. See, e.g., Bruce Babbitt, The Endangered Species Act & Takings: A Call for Inno-
vation Within the Terms of the Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 355, 367 (1994) ( “Controversy about the
ESA is not due to deficiencies in the ESA itself; rather, it is the willful failure of public
officials to use the Act.”).
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ministration that could enlist rather than alienate public opinion.”312 To
Secretary Babbitt, the fix was simple. “He judged that a series of reforms
could be implemented unilaterally and consistently with the statute,
which would accomplish both goals.”313 The Administration undertook a
transformation of the Act through administrative means, knowing that
they were altering the Act’s fundamental structure “through habitat con-
servation plans, safe harbor agreements, candidate conservation agree-
ments, and other tools. Many of these devices were crafted without
express sanction in the statute.”314 During the ESA’s reauthorization
fight, amidst a changing and challenging political climate, in a time when
the Act would normally evolve through statutory amendments,315 the ad-
ministrators of the ESA undertook an administrative evolution of the Act
rather than allow Congress to fundamentally alter the super statute itself.
The growth of the Safe Harbor Program is analogous to proliferation of
a successful trait through a population. The Services faced strong pres-
sures on all their programs to develop better ways to work with private
landowners, and ideas abounded for potential policy improvements.316
These variations came both from within FWS and through outside com-
mentators, and included habitat trading,317 economic incentives,318 mem-
oranda of agreement,319 HCPs,320 and myriad other options.321 From
these ideas, the Safe Harbor Program emerged as the clear winner.
MOAs and HCPs, the two easiest options under the existing statutory
framework, tended to provide insufficient protection and offered little to
smaller landowners. But, as one EDF lawyer noted, “[w]hile there is
312. Leshy, supra note 278, at 213.
313. See id.; see also U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., THE ADMINISTRATION’S 10-POINT
PLAN FOR THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1995), https://www.fws.gov/policy/npi96_06
.html [http://perma.cc/J89R-UDA8] (setting out the Administration’s plan to improve the
Act by “exercising greater administrative flexibility to minimize socioeconomic effects and
assure fair treatment for landowners,” among other changes).
314. Leshy, supra note 278, at 213–14.
315. Compare History of the Endangered Species Act, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia
.org/History_of_the_Endangered_Species_Act [http://perma.cc/L8VB-XLLE], with En-
dangered Species Act: A History of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, U.S. FISH & WILD-
LIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/endangered/laws-policies/esa-history.html [http://perma
.cc/2A27-V685] (showing that most ESA amendments occurred during the Act’s
reauthorizations).
316. Herein lies a major difference between traditional biological evolution and legal
evolution. Organisms under strong selection are unlikely to produce a wide array of possi-
ble solutions to the evolutionary problem, precisely because it is under strong selection.
Social systems have the advantage here, in that they can increase the variation in the face
of selection.
317. Robert Bonnie & Micheal Bean, Habitat Trading for Red-Cockaded Woodpeckers:
Enhancing Recovery, Reducing Conflicts, 13 ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE 7, 7–9 (1996).
318. Elizabeth T. Kennedy et al., New Directions for Red-Cockaded Woodpecker
Habitat Conservation: Economic Incentives, J. FORESTRY, Apr. 1996, at 22–26.
319. Ralph Costa, The US Fish & Wildlife’s Red-Cockaded Woodpecker Private Lands
Conservation Strategy: An Evaluation, 14 ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE 40, 40 (1997).
320. Id.
321. Environmental Defense Fund, A Report to the Bernice Barbour, Beneficia, Un-
derhill, and the National Fish and Wildlife Foundations, in INCENTIVES FOR ENDANGERED
SPECIES CONSERVATION: OPPORTUNITIES IN THE SANDHILLS OF NORTH CAROLINA (1995).
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much to criticize about the FWS’s other approaches to RCWs on private
lands, the Safe Harbor program has to date been an immense success for
both landowners and RCWs.”322 In light of the program’s success, it
quickly proliferated throughout the agency, spreading first to other re-
gions and then, eventually, becoming formal policy at the national level.
It displaced other less successful program. This follows the biological par-
adigm—variation, selection, and inheritance.
The program is also an example of a panda’s thumb, something old
pressed into service in a new and unexpected way. The FWS created the
Safe Harbor program out of whole cloth, with no explicit statutory back-
ing. The program builds on take permits that were part of the original
ESA in 1973, which allowed take “to enhance the propagation or survival
of the affected species” under Section 10(a)(1)(A).323 This authority, del-
egated to the regional office with some guidance from the Safe Harbor
Policy,324 allows the Services to
encourage private and other non-Federal property owners to imple-
ment conservation efforts for listed species by assuring property
owners they will not be subjected to increased property-use restric-
tions if their efforts attract listed species to their properties or in-
crease the numbers or distribution of listed species already present
on their properties.325
In short, the Services and the landowner negotiate a Safe Harbor contract
outlining the improvements that the landowner will make to listed species
habitat on the landowner’s property, and the landowner gets an enhance-
ment of survival permit from the relevant regional office.326
Although the Services rely on Section 10(a)(1)(A) as authority for the
Safe Harbor Program, “there is no evidence that Congress intended to
authorize FWS to enter into long term contracts waiving the govern-
ment’s regulatory authority in this fashion.”327 The statute simply does
not envision this kind of allowance for take, or for take coupled with
potentially transitory benefits (as when a landowner returns the property
322. Robert Bonnie, Strategies for Conservation of the Endangered Red-Cockaded
Woodpecker on Private Lands, 14 ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE 45, 46 (1997).
323. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1539(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2012) (“The Secretary
may permit, under such terms and conditions as he shall prescribe (A) any act otherwise
prohibited by Section 9 [Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2012)] for scientific
purposes or to enhance the propagation or survival of the affected species”).
324. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Permits for Native Species Under the Endangered Spe-
cies Act, https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/permits.pdf [http://perma.cc/
4U24-U4VU] (last visited Feb. 9, 2019) (noting that regional offices issue most permits for
native listed species).
325. Safe Harbor & Candidate Conservation Agreements, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,706, 32,707
(June 17, 1999).
326. Announcement of Final Safe Harbor Policy, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,717, 32,717 (June 17,
1999). This Announcement provides additional details.
327. Patrick A. Parenteau, Rearranging the Deck Chairs: Endangered Species Act Re-
forms in an Era of Mass Extinction, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 227, 287
(1998).
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to the baseline).328 Thus, this is “the kind of jury-rigged adaptation that
characterizes evolutionary phenomena.”329 Constrained by the ESA,
FWS found a new way to use old law and created a new program to meet
a pressing need. Absent their constraints, FWS would have sought con-
gressional approval for the new program and begun with a new statutory
authorization. But they could not, and so they made do with the authority
they had. The locus has shifted, but the legal evolution continues.
In contrast to the federal approach of allowing the Act to evolve via
administrative action, the several states that have embraced the safe har-
bor approach made similar changes using legislation. Three of the four
states with safe harbor programs (California, Hawaii, Kansas, and Flor-
ida) have legislatively authorized their safe harbor programs, with Florida
being the lone exception.330 California added an explicit safe harbor pro-
vision to its California Endangered Species Act (CESA)—Fish and Game
Code Section 2089.2331—in 2009.332 Although the state already honored
federal ESA permits not inconsistent with the CESA333 and allowed take
permits by individuals for management purposes,334 the bill’s author ar-
gued that “legislation is clearly needed . . . to provide certainty to land-
owners that [Fish and Game] is acting with complete authority.”335 The
state’s take permitting authority already granted under CESA was at
least as broad as the federal take permitting authority, but, in a state with
a legislature that readily amends the CESA when warranted,336 a legisla-
tive amendment must have seemed the proper course for the creation of
an entirely new permitting program. Similarly, the Hawaiian Endangered
328. See Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP.
U. L. REV. 21, 78 (2001) (discussing analogous HCP requirements, and arguing that
“[p]rograms differ substantially in the amount of legal certainty that their agreements pro-
vide to regulated parties when there is no explicit statutory authority for the agency to
modify default requirements by these agreements.”); see also Michael J. Bean, New Land-
owner Incentive Tools for Encouraging Conservation Efforts Under the Endangered Species
Act, 13 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 103, 108 (2006) (“Recurrent proposals to ‘codify’ authority for Safe
Harbor Agreements have been made, but existing authority is not in doubt.”); Jonathan H.
Adler, Back to the Future of Conservation: Changing Perceptions of Property Rights &
Environmental Protection, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 987, 1010–11 (2005). Note also that
Michael Bean, the author of several of these updates, helped develop the Safe Harbor
Program. The statute does not appear to explicitly bar this kind of agreement, and the
approach appears to have gone unchallenged. Research uncovered no cases directly chal-
lenging the statutory basis for the Safe Harbor Program.
329. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 456.
330. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 379.2291(2) (West 2017); see also id. § 379.1025 (Florida has
virtually no content in its statutory endangered species act, instead giving the Florida Fish
& Wildlife Commission great discretion. The Commission is created and empowered by
the Florida State Constitution Art. IV, § 9).
331. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 2050–2115.5 (West 2017).
332. Id. § 2089.2.
333. Id. § 2080.1(c).
334. Id. § 2081.1(a).
335. CAL. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, ANALYSIS OF SENATE FLOOR BILL NO. 448, at 7
(Sept. 2, 2009).
336. California has amended the CESA over forty times. See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE
§§ 2050–2115.5 (West 2017) (see collected citations in the Historical and Statutory Notes
section).
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Species Act (HESA) has, since at least 1988, possessed the authority to
allow the take “of any species of aquatic life, wildlife, and land plant for
the purpose of conserving the same,”337 where “conserve” means “to use
. . . all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endan-
gered species or threatened species to the point at which the measures
provided pursuant to this chapter and the Endangered Species Act are no
longer necessary.”338 Nevertheless, Hawaii explicitly amended the HESA
to create a state-level Safe Harbor Program in 1997.339 Again, Hawaii
frequently amends the HESA when conditions warrant it.340 Finally, the
Kansas legislature has, since at least 1989, given its agencies the same
authority the Services used to create the federal Safe Harbor program.341
Nevertheless, Kansas explicitly amended its act in 1997 to create a Safe
Harbor Program.342 Kansas has amended its act only four times since its
passage in 1975.343 These states show a clear trend. In places where the
underlying endangered species statute has not ossified, endangered spe-
cies acts tended to evolve via legislative changes. At the federal level, this
same degree and type of change necessarily grew from administrative
evolution of the law because the legislature could not successfully amend
the federal statute.
C. EVOLUTION OF EXPERIMENTAL POPULATIONS
The ESA provides several mechanisms for the reintroduction of listed
species.344 Congress added one reintroduction method, the experimental
population approach, in 1982345 for the express purpose of easing social
and political pressures around reintroductions.346 Under this mechanism,
the Services may reintroduce a listed species to the wild with a reduced
suite of protections, easing concerns that nearby resource users might
have to change their status quo to avoid violations of the Act. For nones-
337. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 195D-3 (West 2017).
338. Id. § 195D-2.
339. See id. at § 195D-22; see also Kishida, supra note 310, at 549.
340. Hawaii has amended its statute over twenty times. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 195D-1-32 (West 2017) (see collected citations in the Historical and Statutory Notes
section).
341. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 32-961 (West 2017) (allowing the administrators of the Kansas
version of the Endangered Species Act to permit take to “enhance the propagation or
survival of the affected species”). This mirrors the ESA language exactly. See Endangered
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1539(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2012) (“The Secretary may permit, under
such terms and conditions as he shall prescribe (A) any act otherwise prohibited by Section
1538 [Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2012)] for scientific purposes or to en-
hance the propagation or survival of the affected species”).
342. See 1997 Kan. Sess. Laws Ch. 113; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 32-962 (West 2017).
343. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 32-962 (see collected citations in the Historical and Statu-
tory Notes section).
344. Karrigan Bo¨rk, Note, Listed Species Reintroductions on Private Land—Limiting
Landowner Liability under the Endangered Species Act, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 177 (2011).
345. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1411.
346. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at *34 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2834
(noting the legislation will ease restrictions where “the release of these populations will
continue to be frustrated by public opposition”); see also Holly Doremus, Restoring En-
dangered Species: The Importance of Being Wild, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 20 (1999).
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sential experimental populations,347 the Act suspends many of its protec-
tions, including critical habitat designations, the formal consultation
requirements under Section 7, and the automatic take protections under
Section 9.348 In place of these automatic protections, the Services promul-
gate regulations on a case-by-case basis, allowing both incidental and in-
tentional take of these reintroduced populations.349 “[S]ection 10(j) is a
tool with one purpose . . . to relax the protections otherwise provided by
the Endangered Species Act.”350 As of January 2018, FWS reports sixty-
four experimental population reintroductions, although this total ex-
cludes NMFS reintroductions.351 Professor Frederico Cheever has written
the seminal work on experimental populations,352 so this article limits its
discussion to the aspects of the program that demonstrate an evolution of
the Act by the Services.
1. Pitfalls of Experimental Populations
For all the good this provision has done, enabling such controversial
reintroductions as the red wolf,353 the Mexican wolf,354 the Rio Grande
silvery minnow,355 the black footed ferret,356 whooping cranes,357 and
myriad other species, it raises significant risks for listed species. The ex-
perimental population designation includes not only the reintroduced in-
dividuals, but “any offspring arising solely therefrom.”358 The Act
provides no automatic trigger for removal of the experimental population
designation and does not explicitly provide the Services with the power to
remove this designation.359 Finally, the Services have interpreted the Act
347. Endangered Species Act 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j)(2)(B) (2012) (noting that the Services
must, “determine, on the basis of the best available information, whether or not [the rein-
troduced] population is essential to the continued existence of an endangered species or a
threatened species.”). Thus far, no populations have been deemed essential.
348. Id. § 1539(j)(2)(C).
349. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at *34.
350. Federico Cheever, From Population Segregation to Species Zoning: The Evolution
of Reintroduction Law Under Section 10(J) of the Endangered Species Act, 1 WYO. L. REV.
287, 306 (2001).
351. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., SPECIES REPORTS: EXPERIMENTAL POPULATIONS
(2018), available at http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/pub/experimentalPopulations.jsp [http://
perma.cc/29FS-PVRX].
352. Cheever, supra note 350, at 287.
353. 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(c) (2017) (allowing take of wolves in the act of killing livestock
or even wolves simply found on private property, in some cases, among other allowable
takes).
354. Id. § 17.84(k) (allowing take of wolves in the act of killing livestock; wolves simply
found on private property, in some cases; and wolves having an undue impact on big game
animals, among other allowable takes).
355. Id. § 17.84(u)(2)(i) (allowing all incidental take associated with “the carrying out
of an otherwise lawful activity, such as recreation (e.g., fishing, boating, wading, trapping,
or swimming), agriculture, and other activities that are in accordance with Federal, State,
and local laws and regulations”).
356. Id. § 17.84(g).
357. Id. § 17.84(h)(2) (allowing take “accidental and incidental to an otherwise lawful
activity”).
358. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j)(1) (2012).
359. See id. § 1539(j).
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to allow them to remove protections from any individual of a listed spe-
cies that enters the area where an experimental population of that species
has been established.360 In essence, then, the experimental population
designation has the potential to undercut the very purpose of the Act—
the recovery of wild, unmanaged populations of listed species.
The Act recognizes this threat. It circumscribes the power of the Ser-
vices to create experimental populations by providing several require-
ments for experimental populations.361 Central to this article’s analysis,
the Services may create an experimental population “only when, and at
such times as, the population is wholly separate geographically from
nonexperimental populations of the same species,”362 and only “outside
the current range of such species.”363 This “geographic isolation” require-
ment should substantially circumscribe the use of the experimental popu-
lation designation. But the Services have essentially read the requirement
out of the Act. The experimental population designation has become so
essential to Service efforts to reintroduce species in the face of political or
social opposition, they have, in effect, changed the law to permit the un-
bridled use of experimental populations. This is a prime example of the
Service evolving the law beyond the limits of the statute.
2. Changing the Experimental Populations Requirements
Professor Cheever’s paper documents this evolution. As he describes it,
“[i]nitially, USFWS . . . embrac[ed] the notion of population separation as
a legal ‘requirement’ and undertook active population segregation. How-
ever, over time, as USFWS began contemplating more complex rein-
troductions with greater chances of population overlap, it began adopting
a more flexible approach to the notion of geographical separation.”364 In
an early experimental population reintroduction, FWS reintroduced the
red wolf to the Alligator River National Wildlife Refuge in North Caro-
lina in 1987.365 The wolves all wore radio collars, and any wolf leaving the
experimental population area was supposed to be recaptured by FWS for
transportation back to the designated area. FWS was resolved to main-
tain geographic isolation from any other potential populations.
360. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(x)(2)(ii) (“Any wood bison found within the Alaska
wood bison [nonessential experimental population] area will be considered part of the
[nonessential experimental population].”); id. § 17.84(p)(9)(ii) (“All falcons found in the
wild within the boundaries of the [nonessential experimental population] area after the
first releases will be considered members of the [nonessential experimental population].”);
id. § 17.84(g)(9)(ii) (“Any black-footed ferret found in the wild within these counties will
be considered part of the nonessential experimental population after the first breeding
season following the first year of releases of black-footed ferret.”).
361. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j).
362. See id. § 1539(j)(1); see also Wyoming Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbit, 199 F.3d 1224,
1232 (10th Cir. 2000).
363. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j)(2)(A).
364. Cheever, supra note 350, at 320.
365. Determination of Experimental Population Status for an Introduced Population of
Red Wolves in North Carolina, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,790, 41,790 (Nov. 19, 1986) (to be codified
at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
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The latest wolf reintroduction, the gray wolf in Yellowstone National
Park, contrasts with this early effort. FWS planned to reintroduce an ex-
perimental population of gray wolves in Yellowstone National Park and
central Idaho,366 areas where isolated wolves and some small packs al-
ready existed, even absent the reintroduction.367 To bring this reintroduc-
tion effort within the statutory confines of the ESA, that is, to ensure that
the reintroduced “population is wholly separate geographically from
nonexperimental populations of the same species,”368 and “outside the
current range of such species,”369 FWS simply redefined the term “wolf
population.” Under its new definition, a population required “at least two
breeding pairs of gray wolves that each successfully raise at least two
young to December 31 of their birth year for 2 consecutive years.”370 In
FWS’s view, this definition ensured that individual wolves or even a sin-
gle family of wolves could interact with the reintroduced population with-
out endangering its experimental status. Both the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits have upheld this sleight of hand.371
In 2010, the Tenth Circuit again blessed the Services’ approach,372 up-
holding the experimental reintroduction of Northern Aplomada Falcons
in New Mexico, well within flying range of an established population of
the same falcons.373 FWS admitted “it would be virtually impossible to
preclude naturally occurring individual falcons from intermingling with
the experimental population,”374 and the Court noted that FWS’ conclu-
sion that there was no geographic overlap was one of “two fairly conflict-
ing views.”375 Nevertheless, the Court ultimately deferred to FWS’s
expertise and responsibility for administering the Act.376
366. Establishment of a Nonessential Experimental Population of Gray Wolves in Cen-
tral Idaho & Southwestern Montana, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,266, 60,266 (Nov. 22, 1994) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); Establishment of a Nonessential Experimental Population of
Gray Wolves in Yellowstone National Park in Wyoming, Idaho, and Montana, 59 Fed. Reg.
60,252, 60,252 (Nov. 22, 1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
367. Establishment of a Nonessential Experimental Population of Gray Wolves in Cen-
tral Idaho & Southwestern Montana, 59 Fed. Reg. at 60,266.
368. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j)(2) (2012); see also Wyoming Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbit, 199
F.3d 1224, 1232 (10th Cir. 2000).
369. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j)(2)(A).
370. Establishment of a Nonessential Experimental Population of Gray Wolves in Cen-
tral Idaho & Southwestern Montana, 59 Fed. Reg. at 60,266-01.
371. United States v. McKittrick, 142 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 1998); Wyo. Farm Bu-
reau Fed’n, 199 F.3d at 1234. The district court rejected the approach but was overturned
by the Tenth Circuit. See Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 987 F. Supp. 1349, 1373. (D.
Wyo. 1997) (“[T]he mere fact that Defendants have drawn a line which purports . . . be-
tween the existing wolf population in Montana and either of the proposed experimental
population areas is insufficient and contrary to law.”).
372. Forest Guardians v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 611 F.3d 692, 707–08 (10th Cir.
2010).
373. Id. at 701.
374. Id. (citing Establishment of a Nonessential Experimental Population of Northern
Aplomado Falcons in New Mexico and Arizona, 71 Fed. Reg. 42,298, 42,300 (July 26, 2006)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17)).
375. Id. at 709.
376. Id. at 710.
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Finally, NMFS’s reintroduction of spring run Chinook salmon to the
San Joaquin River as an experimental population exemplifies how far the
Services’ definition of experimental population has evolved from the geo-
graphic isolation requirements. Pursuant to a settlement agreement ena-
bled by California Fish and Game Code Section 5937,377 on the San
Joaquin River below Friant Dam, NMFS agreed to reintroduce spring run
Chinook to the San Joaquin by 2012. Friant Dam dried the riverbed be-
low the dam for roughly sixty miles, but the settlement agreement also
required the Bureau of Reclamation to return water to the river. This re-
watering and reintroduction effort is the largest ever. It is an unprece-
dented effort.
The reintroduction of threatened spring run Chinook raised significant
concerns for Friant Dam’s downstream landowners and water users.378 In
response, NMFS suggested reintroducing the spring run Chinook as an
experimental population, and the settlement agreement ultimately fol-
lowed that course. The experimental population designation determined
“all CV spring-run Chinook salmon, including those that have been re-
leased or propagated, naturally or artificially, within the experimental
population area” in the San Joaquin River are considered part of the San
Joaquin River experimental population.379 Rather than try to track the
reintroduced population, NMFS simply drew a circle and said anything in
that circle is by law experimental. This conflicts with the Act, because
there were already spring run fish in the area.380 Moreover, the experi-
mental population will join with other salmon populations in the ocean.
There are no provisions in the Act allowing for only temporary isolation
of experimental populations. This experimental population inarguably
lacks any real geographic isolation and is clearly not “outside the current
377. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Rodgers, 381 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (E.D. Cal. 2005). The
terms of this settlement were later approved by Congress through its enactment of the San
Joaquin River Restoration Settlement Act. See Joaquin River Restoration Settlement Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-11, §10011, 123 Stat. 1349 (2009).
378. See, e.g., Kimberly Geiger, San Joaquin River plan stalls in House / Lawmakers
balk—some water users weren’t part of talks, SFGATE (Sept. 22, 2006), http://www.sfgate
.com/green/article/WASHINGTON-San-Joaquin-River-plan-stalls-in-2469354.php [http://
perma.cc/HN67-DTAK].
379. Endangered Threatened Species: Designation of a Nonessential Experimental
Population of Central Valley Spring-Run Chinook Salmon Below Friant Dam in the San
Joaquin River, CA, 50 Fed. Reg. 79622 (Dec. 31. 2013) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223).
380. Although salmon generally return to their natal streams to spawn, they do not
always succeed in finding their home rivers. Those fish that do not return to their natal
river, termed “strays,” fulfill important evolutionary roles, maintaining genetic connections
between large metapopulations of salmon and recolonizing streams where local popula-
tions have been extirpated. QUINN, supra note 224, at 91. Like any salmon population, the
spring run Chinook salmon in the Central Valley stray. The northern half of the Central
Valley hosts several separate populations of spring run Chinook, and for years portions of
these populations have shown up in the southern half of the Central Valley, in many
tributaries of the San Joaquin, according the NMFS data. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV.,
5-YEAR REVIEW: SUMMARY AND EVALUATION OF CENTRAL VALLEY SPRING-RUN CHI-
NOOK SALMON EVOLUTIONARILY SIGNIFICANT UNIT (2011), available at https://reposito
ry.library.noaa.gov/view/noaa/17018. These strays will almost certainly enter the experi-
mental population area as it is re-watered and the habitat there improves.
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range” of such species, as required for an experimental population desig-
nation to comply with the Act.381
Nevertheless, the reintroduction has gone forward as an experimental
population, and the special regulations allow any unintentional, nonnegli-
gent take of the salmon in the experimental population areas.382 For ex-
ample, salmon may be killed during normal irrigation operations or while
driving through informal low water crossings in the streambed, both with-
out violating the Act. This reduces protection for salmon that were not
part of the reintroduced population. Regardless, based on the precedent
discussed above and the buy-in to the reintroduction effort from many,
perhaps most, potential litigants, NMFS’s decision seems unlikely to be
overturned. Through deference by the courts and due to public demand
or acquiescence, the Services have effectively altered the Act’s require-
ments for experimental populations, which amounts to another evolution
of the Act itself.
3. Evidence for Legal Evolution from the Experimental Population
Reintroductions
The reintroduction of the spring run Chinook to the San Joaquin is
particularly telling because, as with the Safe Harbor program, it juxta-
poses the ESA, with its political gridlock, with CESA, which does not
suffer the same degree of controversy. Spring run Chinook are listed as
threatened, and likewise protected from take, under CESA. CESA does
not allow designation of populations as experimental populations383 and
so did not provide the California Department of Fish and Wildlife
(CDFW) with a mechanism to exempt the introduction. Nevertheless,
CDFW secured an amendment to CESA to allow any take permitted
under the federal experimental population designation.384 In this context
of a functioning legislative system for evolving the law, the California leg-
islature amended CESA to improve its function in light of changing socie-
tal needs, a stark contrast from the federal legislature’s failure to address
experimental populations and the Service’s subsequent evolution of the
ESA on their accord.385
381. H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at 33 (1982) (“[I]n the case of the introduction of individu-
als of a listed fish species into a portion of a stream where the same species already occurs,
the introduced specimens would not be treated as an ‘experimental population’ separate
from the non-introduced specimens.”).
382. 50 C.F.R. § 223.301(b)(4)(i) (2017).
383. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 2080, 2081 (West 2017).
384. Id. § 2080.4 (“If a population of spring run Chinook salmon in the San Joaquin
River is designated as an experimental population under subsection (j) of Section 1539 of
Title 16 of the United States Code, no further authorization or approval is necessary under
this chapter for any person to incidentally take members of that experimental
population”).
385. Implementation of the settlement agreement also required a federal act, the San
Joaquin River Restoration Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 111-11, §§ 10001–10203, 123 Stat.
992 (2009), but that act avoided any amendment of underlying environmental laws, includ-
ing the ESA. Congress directed the Services to “comply with all applicable Federal and
State laws, rules, and regulations, including the National Environmental Policy Act of
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More broadly, the Services’ approach to experimental population
seems to be a clear example of evolution in the law, evolving from the
statutory definition, or at least an administrative definition that honored
the statutory definition, to a definitional approach that honored the stat-
ute only in the breach. The Services employed a variety of strategies in
the early reintroduction efforts, until they found an approach that fit
within their resource and political constraints and the courts ultimately
approved that approach. This is the variation and selection. They contin-
ued that successful approach, with slight variations, for later reintroduc-
tions, including the falcon and the salmon. This is the inheritance.
Indeed, Professor Cheever’s article uses evolutionary terms to tell the
story of this progression, even using the term “evolution” in his title. But
his approach is ultimately not an evolutionary approach to the law itself,
but rather uses the evolutionary approach as a way to tell the story of the
experimental population. The article draws no explicit parallels to the bi-
ological process of evolution and provides no evolutionary analysis.
What, then, does an evolutionary analysis tell us about administrative
law?
IV. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE EVOLUTION
OF THE LAW
Drawing conclusions from a preliminary study of one statute using a
nascent legal approach is risky, but this preliminary analysis points the
way to at least a few conclusions. First, it suggests administrative evolu-
tion of the law is simply the reality for many statutes, particularly change-
resistant super statutes like the ESA.386 This is not terribly surprising,
given the legislature’s inability to make changes to these laws and the
courts’ determination not to make policy decisions for agencies.387 Al-
though environmental lawmaking, at least, seems to be marked by occa-
sional bursts of legislative action (the early 1970s and perhaps the early
1990s, for example), the long interstitial periods still see significant legal
evolution of the law by administrative rulemaking. While this nonlinear
1969 . . . and the [ESA].” San Joaquin River Restoration Settlement Act § 10006(a)(1).
Congress seems to prefer that the Services push beyond the Act on their own, carrying out
the administrative evolution of the law, rather than take on that political hot potato
themselves.
386. See Michael Ray Harris, Breaking the Grip of the Administrative Triad: Agency
Policy Making Under A Necessity-Based Doctrine, 86 TUL. L. REV. 273, 275 (2011) (ac-
knowledging that “[t]he continued existence of . . . a policy-wielding bureaucracy in
America is not subject to doubt”).
387. This reality also has implications for the evolutionary approach to administrative
law. Ruhl suggests that one should measure fitness by how well a law fulfills its policy, in
hopes that “the fitness of a normatively undesirable law—a law the policy for which no
longer is (or perhaps never was) one we wish to pursue in the sociolegal system—may lead
us to consider the need for modifying or repealing the law more immediately and more
thoroughly than if the law were relatively unfit.” Ruhl, supra note 21, at 1451–52. But this
measure of fitness does not advance the study of evolution via administrative lawmaking,
since the underlying laws are so resistant to change as to be permanent.
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lawmaking pattern is an acknowledged phenomenon in public law,388 ev-
olutionary approaches have largely overlooked the continued gradual
growth in the environmental law via administrative action.
Second, given this reality, advocates for change in the law would be
best advised to aim for administrative fixes, following Secretary Babbitt’s
model with the Endangered Species Act. Recent administrations have
taken this approach with significant success389 and legal academics have
been exploring this approach for some time. This, perhaps, gives theoreti-
cal backing to that approach. This does raise questions about the evolu-
tionary metaphor when administrations abruptly change policies, as seen
in the climate change policies of the Bush, Obama, and Trump adminis-
trations. Such rapid change in selective environments is not outside the
scope of an evolutionary explanation of administrative law, and the ad-
ministrative actions involved in these shifts are still subject to the evolu-
tionary constraints identified here (e.g. path dependent, incremental
change, etc.), but more work is needed in this area.
Third, the consideration of agency administration as an evolutionary
process also suggests several changes that would increase the rate of
evolution. At the outset, this assumes that increased evolution of the law
by agencies is a normatively good thing. This is, to put it mildly, not a
universal position. Administrative agencies are often criticized as “un-
wieldy and antidemocratic.”390 Moreover, this view of agencies does little
to address concerns raised by the public choice model of administrative
law.391 And this idea cuts directly against Professor Epstein’s view of
agencies as a normative, but perhaps sometimes necessary, evil.392 In-
stead, it builds on an admittedly progressive vision that “rests on the key
assumption that government officials armed with technical expertise and
acting in good faith to advance the public interest can systematically out-
388. Hornstein, supra note 20, at 932 (noting “the literature on ‘republican moments,’
which are defined as extraordinary periods when broad segments of the electorate sud-
denly become intensely interested in a political issue, causing legislators to enact statutes
that are far more in line with public values than special interest models would predict”).
389. E.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2248
(2001) (noting that “Clinton and his White House staff turned to the bureaucracy to
achieve, to the extent it could, the full panoply of his domestic policy goals”).
390. Melissa Mortazavi, Rulemaking Ex Machina, 117 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 202,
204 (2017).
391. See Jim Rossi, Public Choice Theory and the Fragmented Web of the Contemporary
Administrative State, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1746, 1754 (1998); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED,
CHAOS, & GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (Yale U. Press
1997); Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before
A New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 587 (2003) (“[A]gencies could be biased
toward well-organized, more narrowly focused interest groups, since those groups may be
especially able to provide regulators with information valuable to the agency or to invoke
discipline by political branches.”); see also Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks:
Restoring the Balance of Powers in the Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L. REV. 757, 814 (1991).
392. Epstein, supra note 55, at 494 (arguing for the adoption of “structures that make it
more difficult to pass and implement legislation, in the uncertain hope that this more ardu-
ous process will be more likely to weed out factional reforms of dubious merit than genu-
ine social improvements” and suggesting that review should begin with the an assumption
against state action).
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perform any system of limited government whose major function was to
support and protect market institutions.”393 From this vantage point, as-
suming the original purposes of the relevant statute remain a significant
selective pressure on regulations and assuming this pressure is relatively
constant over time, such an increase would be expected to lead to norma-
tively “better” regulations through evolution.394 With regard to judicial
review, this kind of directional selection might be ensured through a rein-
vigoration of the zone of interest test’s bar on those seeking an outcome
“inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute,”395 although this
prospect seems dim in light of Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Con-
trol Components, Inc.396
Increased rates of administrative evolution of the law could also par-
tially ameliorate some of the traditional criticisms of the administrative
state, particularly the lack of accountability or democratic responsive-
ness.397 Increased evolution in an administrative state would allow in-
creased exposure to the selective agents identified here—internal agency
pressure, court challenges, and political pressure from several sources
(the public, the legislature, the rest of the executive branch, etc.), which
could democratize agency accountability, assuming that these pressures
reflect, in some way, the desires of the public. This may not be a safe
assumption, and increased rates of evolution may simply allow more op-
portunities for rent seeking or other regulatory pathologies.
Evolutionary studies teach that many factors influence the rate of
evolution, including some that, analogous to administrative law evolution,
are open to manipulation. For example, shorter generation times in popu-
lations spurs faster evolution.398 Intuitively, mutations and recombination
that increases genetic diversity occur during reproductive events, and so
393. Id. at 492.
394. This idea lies at the heart of adaptive management, which aims to improve man-
agement (often ecosystem management) through an iterative process of managing, reflect-
ing, and adapting over time. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the
Endangered Species Act, & the Institutional Challenges of New Age Environmental Protec-
tion, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 52–53 (2001).
395. See Clarke v. Securities Industry Association, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987); see also
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 24.17, at 279 (2d ed. 1983)
(“Something resembling the ‘zone’ test may often be sound. A statute or rule designed to
benefit a particular class may not be asserted by nonmembers of the class.”).
396. 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1388 (2014); see generally Brannon P. Denning & Sarah F.
Bothma, Zone-of-Interests Standing in Constitutional Cases After Lexmark, 21 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 97, 99 (2017).
397. Mendelson, supra note 391, at 661.
398. Andrew P. Martin & Stephen R. Palumbi, Body Size, Metabolic Rate, Generation
Time, & the Molecular Clock, 90 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. AM. 4087, 4088 (1993);
Stephen A. Smith & Michael J. Donoghue, Rates of Molecular Evolution Are Linked to
Life History in Flowering Plants, SCIENCE, Oct. 3, 2008, at 86, 89; Arne Ø. Mooers & Paul
H. Harvey, Metabolic Rate, Generation Time, & the Rate of Molecular Evolution in Birds, 3
MOLECULAR PHYLOGENETICS & EVOLUTION 344, 344 (1994); Jessica A. Thomas et al., A
Generation Time Effect on the Rate of Molecular Evolution in Invertebrates, 27 MOLECU-
LAR BIOLOGY & EVOLUTION 1173, 1176 (although many of these studies address only neu-
tral variation, this last study analyzes both neutral and adaptive variation and finds that
shorter generation times increases both).
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more frequent reproductive events lead to more genetic diversity. This
genetic diversity is the raw material for evolution. Further, shorter gener-
ation times mean that selection within a population occurs more fre-
quently, thus increasing the rate of adaptive evolution.399 By analogy,
decreasing generation times in rulemaking would also increase the evolu-
tionary rate. This would mean more frequent rulemaking, admittedly an
onerous proposition,400 but would likely increase the responsiveness of
the agency to existing selective pressures. The ESA already imposes re-
quirements of this sort through mandatory reassessment of listed species
every five years,401 but the administrative costs and missed deadlines as-
sociated with this requirement suggest caution in deploying the approach
more widely.
At least one form of agency policymaking would stand to benefit from
this change. When agencies reinterpret their own longstanding regula-
tions and use the old regulations to come to new, inconsistent conclu-
sions, this amounts to a new rulemaking in function, if not in form. Courts
generally grant significant deference, termed Auer or Seminole Rock def-
erence,402 to agency interpretations of their own regulations. Under this
standard, the reviewing court gives interpretations “controlling weight
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”403 As
Justice Roberts has noted, controversies around agency interpretations of
their own regulations “arise as a matter of course on a regular basis.”404
Some Supreme Court precedent suggests that an agency loses deference
when its new interpretation of a regulation conflicts with longstanding
agency practices,405 particularly if the new interpretation conflicts with
the agency’s intent at the time the regulation was promulgated.406 In
practice, however, courts have not followed this approach as closely as
they should. Even the Supreme Court does not appear to follow it terri-
bly closely.407 Clearly requiring agencies to conduct a new rulemaking
399. See Thomas et al., supra note 398, at 1178; see also Patrick M. Garry, Accommodat-
ing the Administrative State: The Interrelationship Between the Chevron and Nondelegation
Doctrines, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 921, 948 (2006).
400. Mortazavi, supra note 390, at 207 (discussing the burdensome and almost over-
whelming nature of rulemakings in the modern administrative state).
401. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(2)(A) (2012).
402. Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 371 (2012) (citing
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S.
452, 461 (1997)).
403. Bowles, 325 U.S. at 414.
404. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
405. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012) (noting that
“deference is . . . unwarranted when there is reason to suspect that the agency’s interpreta-
tion does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in ques-
tion. . . .This might occur when the agency’s interpretation conflicts with a prior
interpretation”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
406. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994).
407. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Bible, 136 S. Ct. 1607, 1608 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). In his dissenting opinion for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Manion explained that
the interpretation at issue was “entirely new and inconsistent with [the agency’s] prior
interpretations.” Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 799 F.3d 633, 674 (7th Cir. 2015).
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when changing a longstanding interpretation of their own regulations
would effectively decrease generation times and increase the rate of ad-
ministrative evolution of the law.
Evolutionary biology also indicates a strong correlation between rates
of adaptive evolution and population size.408 Again, this is intuitive.
Larger populations allow more opportunity for the advent of genetic vari-
ation within the population, increasing the feedstock available for evolu-
tionary processes. Increasing the number of approaches that an agency
takes to a given issue increases the effective “population size” of regula-
tory approaches. This increase would present more policy variation to any
selective pressures in play and allow better approaches to arise more
often. Although at first blush this would seem to cut against some core
benefits of agencies—regulatory certainty and uniform application of
rules, for example—many agencies already exhibit a highly diverse set of
responses to any given regulatory question. For example, Professor Dave
Owen provides a detailed account of significant regional variation across
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ regulatory programs and notes that
such variation can produce new regulatory innovations more quickly than
a centralized, unitary approach.409 Provided that an agency focuses on
utilizing the policy innovations that develop this method of effectively
increasing the population of regulations subject to selection, that same
agency can increase the rate of evolution of these laws.410 Notably, re-
gional variation produced both the Safe Harbor Program and the original
experimental population designations. As other commentators have
noted, “sociolegal regimes that favor less hierarchical, flatter, and more
decentralized power structures will tend to outperform competing models
in that respect.”411 Professor Ruhl’s cogent analysis voices a strong con-
cern that “[t]he centralized federal regulatory state, in other words, is
taking the ‘sex’ out of democracy and thus impeding the adaptiveness of
the American sociolegal system.”412 Although, as suggested by Owen’s
piece, this concern may be overblown, Professor Ruhl is certainly correct
that less centralization would allow for better exploration of the evolu-
408. Richard Frankham, Relationship of Genetic Variation to Population Size in Wild-
life, 10 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1500, 1507 (1996) (“Theoretical predictions that reduc-
tions in population size reduce genetic variation have been amply verified.”); Thomas et
al., supra note 398, at 1178 (noting that “the fixation of adaptive substitutions is expected
to be more efficient in larger populations”).
409. Dave Owen, Regional Federal Administration, 63 UCLA L. REV. 58, 108–110
(2016).
410. Id. at 109 (arguing that “[r]eplication and scaling up are key components of any
successful program of policy experimentation, and an organization in which regional staff
frequently talk to their counterparts elsewhere has clear advantages”).
411. Ruhl, supra note 21, at 1418–19; see also Hornstein, supra note 20, at 935–36 (rec-
ognizing the need for increased experimentation in environmental law); Daniel A. Farber
& Jody Freeman, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795, 798–800 (2005).
There is a tension between continuing experimentation and exploiting the effective ap-
proaches already in place. For a full discussion, see Hornstein, supra note 20, at 942.
412. Ruhl, supra note 21, at 1419.
2019] Evolutionary Theory of Administrative Law 135
tionary landscape and should lead to the emergence of better solutions to
some of our pressing administrative challenges.
Fourth, increased selective pressure also speeds adaptive evolution,413
so actions increasing the strength or frequency of selection in the admin-
istrative law realm will also speed adaption of administrative laws. One
area, judicial review, is particularly able to provide stronger selection
through changes in the application of Chevron doctrine. Tightening the
application of Chevron’s second step will ensure not only that administra-
tive lawmaking continues to evolve, but that it also evolves toward the
policy Congress intended when it created the underlying statute. A recent
study found that, when circuit courts get to Chevron’s second step, they
defer to agencies a stunning 93.8% of the time, as compared to 39% of
the time at step one.414 Because 70% of the decisions relied on step two
analysis, the circuit courts approved agency statutory interpretations
nearly 80% of the time.415 Tightening step two analysis could significantly
increase the force of selection in the evolution of administrative law and
ensure a greater degree of directionality to that evolution.416
Courts could also heighten other kinds of selection by becoming a bit
more formalistic in determining when to defer to agencies. For example,
the Supreme Court has ruled “interpretations contained in policy state-
ments [are] beyond the Chevron pale,”417 and the Administrative Proce-
dures Act itself exempts “general statements of policy” from its
rulemaking requirements.418 Nevertheless, courts routinely give policy
statements Chevron deference under the Mead standard, which applies
Chevron deference “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to
the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise
of that authority.”419 By replacing a bright line rule on policy statements
with a hazy test, the Supreme Court creates ambiguity for stakeholders
seeking to engage with agency decision-making. The Mead standard only
applies in retrospect because it is based, in part, on whether the agency
claims deference for the policy it seeks to rely on. During agency poli-
cymaking, stakeholders may not be able to discern whether the policy in
question will be legally binding on the agency or whether it will eventu-
ally receive deference in the courts. Without this information, stakehold-
ers cannot determine how much time and energy to invest in the
413. See, e.g., Alistair S. Jump & Josep Penuelas, Running to Stand Still: Adaptation &
the Response of Plants to Rapid Climate Change, 8 ECOLOGY LETTERS 1010, 1010–11
(2005).
414. Barnett & Walker, supra note 103, at 6.
415. Id.
416. See Ruhl, supra note 66, at 925 (“Chevron creates an anti-majoritarian force within
agencies and allows them to move policy away from the actual policy intended by
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policymaking effort. If stakeholders fail to adequately engage in poli-
cymaking based on this uncertainty, they would, in effect, reduce the se-
lection pressure on the agency policymaking, slowing the administrative
evolution of the law.
The DPS policy provides a good example of this phenomenon. The Ser-
vices did not clearly indicate that they were making a rule with the force
of law when they prepared the DPS policy, noting only that it would
“guide the evaluation of distinct vertebrate population segments for the
purposes of listing, delisting, and reclassifying under the Act.”420 Even
the Services’ approach to the policymaking, which allowed for public
comment, does not clearly indicate that the policy was, at the outset,
meant to have the force of law, because the Services’ public comment
approach was mandated by the ESA.421 The Service considered promul-
gating the policy as a rule, but ultimately rejected that approach.422 Only
later, when the Services sought and received Chevron deference during
review of the DPS policy,423 was the importance of subjecting the draft
policy to strong selection pressure truly clear to stakeholders, and clarity
only after the rulemaking does not give stakeholders the impetus to com-
ment they need at the outset of policy making. For better public partici-
pation, and the improved opportunity for administrative evolution of the
law that implies, courts should require agencies to clearly identify at the
outset any policymaking that will have the force of law or they otherwise
believe will merit Chevron deference. Agencies should not be able to
hide new rules as mere informal policymaking.
Finally, this theoretical approach should provide some reassurance to
commentators who have argued that the advent of the administrative
state has ended (or at least greatly slowed) the evolutionary improvement
of American law. Professor Ruhl argues “the administrative state, now
that it has reached an advanced, mature state of power, is simply too rigid
and thus not equipped to work hand in hand with a dynamic, adapting
democracy.”424 His broader argument suggests that administrative take-
over of legislative functions has effectively ended much of the evolution
of law. But, to quote the fictional scientist Ian Malcolm from the popular
film Jurassic Park, “[i]f there is one thing the history of evolution has
taught us, it’s that life will not be contained. Life breaks free. It expands
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ments Under the Endangered Species Act; Request for Public Comment, 59 Fed. Reg.
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422. Nw. Ecosys. All. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Servs. 475 F.3d 1136, 1143 n.6 (9th Cir.
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to new territories. It crashes through barriers. Painfully, maybe even . . .
dangerously . . . .”425 Evolution of the law continues within the adminis-
trative state.
The evolutionary theory of administrative law suggests many additional
avenues for research. For example, biology offers a range of weird and
wonderful examples of evolution gone awry, and many of these examples
may be closely analogous to legal evolutions.
Some organisms exhibit conspicuous traits that reduce their odds of
survival, but nevertheless increase their odds of passing along their ge-
netic materials—consider the male peacocks’ tail,426 bright colors on
male fish, or elaborate antlers on deer. These are examples of sexual se-
lection. In the example of the peacock, peahens “show a strong mating
preference for males with elaborate trains,”427 even though those
peacocks have a harder time surviving due to the very elaborate tails that
make them more attractive. The very trait that is attractive and leads to
successful reproduction makes the peacock less likely to survive. This
phenomenon could show up in legal evolution as well—agencies may be
more likely to choose from the pool of potential rules they think most
likely to be politically attractive, not those most likely to accomplish the
goals of the statute. If an agency is too responsive to prevailing selective
pressures and those pressures conflict with the underlying statute, the
agency may, over time, produce rules that, while attractive, are ill con-
ceived for accomplishing their purpose. Perhaps this would correlate to
agency capture, where the engine to administrative evolution is coopted
by administrators seeking to please the regulated community.
In another form of evolutionary intrigue, evolutionary arms races can
produce outcomes with significant costs for relatively innocent bystand-
ers. In an evolutionary arms race, two competing organisms continue to
evolve to outpace each other, with neither side ever really winning. For
example, a plant population evolving toxins (like nicotine, for example)
that kill or dissuade herbivores inadvertently selects for herbivores resis-
tant to the toxins, and then the plants continue to evolve stronger toxins,
in a never-ending escalation.428 The classic version of the evolutionary
arms race comes from studies on newts and garter snakes. The newts pro-
duce tetrodotoxin, which can kill a human, but many populations of gar-
ter snakes are able to eat the newts with no ill effects.429 The newts
continue to get more toxic, and the garter snakes continue to evolve
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426. Marion Petrie et al., Variation in the Peacock’s Train Shows a Genetic Component,
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greater tolerance, but other species caught in the newts’ toxic crossfire
are unlikely to survive. Analogies to the arms race are easy to conceive in
administrative law. Consider a case where the EPA seeks to eliminate a
source of pollution, but the pollution producers adopt ever more creative
ways to shift that pollutant out from under the existing regulatory regime.
The EPA changes and expands the regime, and the producers again shift
their strategy. Over time, the regulatory structure grows immense and
unwieldy, with draconian punishments and intense records requirements.
The structure grew out of the arms race between the EPA and the pro-
ducer, but innocent bystanders who run afoul of the labyrinthine regula-
tory structure pay the price. Others have suggested some additional
evolutionary oddities worth considering, including preadaptation; cases
where one selection for one trait necessarily carries along other, less de-
sirable traits; and maladaptation due to evolutionary lag time in a rapidly
changing environment.430 These may offer fruitful paths for additional
research.
Finally, additional research using this approach should address other
super statutes and could beneficially compare administrative evolution of
those statutes to administrative rulemaking under statutes that the legis-
lature changes more frequently, to determine how this affects the rate of
administrative evolution of the law.
V. CONCLUSION
Evolutionary analysis of the law has a longstanding place within legal
academia and has provided a productive perspective for centuries of in-
quiry. As we have transitioned to an administrative state, however, we
have lost this evolutionary perspective on the law. This article updates
evolutionary legal theory for the administrative age, exposing for analysis
much of implicit understanding of how administrative legal change oc-
curs. Through three case studies, we see administrative law evolving in
response to selective pressure from changing science, changing political
climates, and changing social needs or desires. The case studies share a
common pattern—presentation of varying policy options, selection acting
on those options until the agency selects one or two policy choices, and
then new policy possibilities arising that inherit vestiges of the past
agency actions. Variation, selection, and inheritance. The pattern mimics
biological evolution in ways that usefully inform our perspective on ad-
ministrative law. Future research should consider the applicability of
evolution to other realms of administrative law, including both fields be-
yond environmental law and administrative law actions beyond rulemak-
ings. Such analysis will aid in determining the broader applicability of the
evolutionary metaphor to administrative law.
430. See generally Rodgers, supra note 60, at 56–60.
